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ETTRODUOTION

V. ' Iv

Mora than thraa yaars hava alr.psad sinoa ths and of the'

mm

Tsroi* brought forth a Icxga nuiiibor of accounts ra dating tto outar and

innar struggia against Hitlsr and his ragimap Soms of thasa rap'orts

'• IV.. ^

tell an authantia story of ths actions of oouragaous rmn. Otliars aro
but fioticious and highly comniarciallizad thrillars or blunt lias

Goncaivadto axtricata thair authors and som3 of tlisir friands ffron
Just prison tarms or denazification difficulties.
The defendant VTjllZSAJGlCJSl told of his resistanco for the

\

first time in May and June 19.48 after he had been confronted v;ith

hundreds of docui-ients showing hin up as the Devil's State Socrotory
wlio had signed ovray the, lives and happiness of millions- of innocent

poopl3»

•
Those acquainted Tfith criminal cases Imow that there often

•eicist in largo murder gangs a few people -who for one reason or another
wahtod to get rid of tlie gang leadesfe or failed to concur with him in

some respects. This in no vray affect their guilt but nay have some

mitigating influonce if the resistance activity has actually resul
ted in blocking or seriously affecting the criminal activities of
blw gangt. WTIZSAJCIC3R himself has never claimed Ond could never claim
that his inner resistance against some of Hitler's methods dotorred

even himself in his v/ork as executive of Murder Incorporated which

I

Oatised tlie death of millions of liutch, French, Belgian, Polish, and

Hungarian human beings in German occupied areas# Among tliem Virero

Jev/s, Catholics, and Protestants - murdered as racially inferior, as
hostages, or as enemies of tlio state or done away vritii under soz^ve
' other mi-irderous program implemented under tlxe control

' or vath the

participation of Vf^IZS/^jJCOU,
r!

VlalBWr • . , J1

Th3 trial briefs dealing with WJlZSAjJCEJlR's vrar crimes

-1,
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and crirus against humanity rsfor in datail to his numsrous signa
tures on such death v/arraiits» Thay bece: testimony on behalf of the

millions vdiora he dispatcliod to the dast and vfhcse tongues -wore si
lenced.

If, despite this deadly proof which the Defenso did
not dare to challenge, tlie Prosecution analyses-WillZSi^ilCKdR^s claim
of resistance at all it does so for two basic reasons:

1, The Frosecuticn wishes to help the Court in

finding out vrliether or not tliere really was ary

.

concrete resistance actiwity on the part of

YTdIZSAJjCKdR "Which could be regarded as mitigating

V

circunstance»

Z* Th-e Prosecution wants to establish the historical

data whic]i night have some be caring upon tho evaluat*
tion of tl)0 degree of guilt of othjer defendants.
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iVjjPOSuH FINDINGS OF FACT

Upon full consideration of the facts and fictions surround

ing the Flea ol Resistance of -..SIZSADCISR the analysis of the
evidence in this brief leads to the folloiijing conclusion;

The defendant .ilZoAlCiu^R v;/as not engaged in resistance
activities.

1JEIZSA1;c;1I;R must be regarded as a man vjho felt himself called

upon to plSj sn important role in his countrya man vjho possessed'
the necessary jsisrsonal qualifications and aiabltion.

Thus^ he

accepted the highest foreign Service position of the regime vjithout
hesitation in 193^^ at a time vjhen there coiiLd no longer be the
slightest doubt in his mind as to the cririiinal Ciic.i*auter of the

Hitler regiiie,

-it may be that he vjould have preferred another

regime^ had another regime offered him still farther-reachiiig
influence,

out since there T;as scarcely prospect of another

regime, he placod his experience and versatility unreservedly
at the disposition of iiitler and Ribbentrop and fulfilled his
diplomatic duties in line v.ath the official policy T'lith a clever
ness and skill far beyond the talents of Ribbentrop.
As an experienced diplomat he \<ne\i how to keep abreast of

a32 political currents and power groupings at home and abroad.
And sld-lled diplcroat tlmt he vas, he regarded it as opportune
to establish and maintain contacts vjherever he observed opposition

tendencies in C-ermanj'-, in order to v/atch the developments closelj?-.

•r.

Possi.bly he wished the opposition in Germany v/ell.

But - and this

is the crux of the matter - he was not \.dlling to undertake the

slightest personal risk in order to support this opposition.

Far •

more was his attention devoted to watching closely for any strength
coming to that opposition from other quarters.

There is no doubt

that he would have been most gladly prepared, should the opposition
have achieved the elimination of Hitler, to have offered his serv

ices to the nevr government, but then only after the opposition had

securely established itself in office,
-3-

Inasmuch as and so long as there was no certain prospect
for a success of that opposition he continued to devote his

time and energies further^, in full d egree and vdth .full success,
to promoting the policies of the Third Reich,

:' K

.V

<•./

jrfli
J
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•'T'.

lo Tha OlJ^im

FciC3d ^vith ov3rvrlialming proof of his criminal activi-bias

uncbr tlu various counts of tho Indictmant tha dafondant TiiillZSAdCl'JR

o^ttarapts to construct an invol-vod cobi-Tab of vagua assortions sustaiiiad primcxily by witrussos daosasod - which runs urifi?T tlio
all^ngulfing titla of "rosistanco" •
" OB# I offarad total rosistancaj and in datail

I Wont to tlia vary nargni and fringj of my possibilitias to offar rasistanca#" (Tr# paga 9,2Z8)

mth this pXsa TGXZSAJ0IC3R wishas to'datract tlio att3ntion of tha Tribunal from tha basic issuas of this law suit ploading
mitiration slmultanaously#

Harr von wJIZSi'^ilOK'lR status that lia occaptad tho high

office of State Sjcr^tcry and ramainad tharain for five daoisiva

years in order to oppose and rosist tlia vary ragiira v/hich had put
him in that position of pov/ar and influanoa.

" o.B In tha intarestof rasistanca I ratainad ny
offica."
(Tr# pagp 8539)

H3 claims, that in ordor to ranain in offica, ha had to

participata in and condom criminal activitias as a mattor of camoufloga.. In ^TilIZ3i^^.;!GK5R' s mannar of nrguimntation - sustainad
witnessGS

l:y- narsonal friends vfhom !m has callad as dafansa/ - his rasidasiro

stanca" is to be undarstood as tha overv/ha Ining/to praserva tlio

poaca or to ra-obtain it for Garrmny oftar Hitler's armies had brolean it avarywliara« "Easistanoo" than, rs T'^IZS/^dCKiIR intarprats

it in mitigation of his criminal activities consisted primarily of
the socrat spreading of the obvious gospeli "Peace is possibla

only Y/ithout Hitlor"

1), Ho did so by dovious noans^to a liraitod

group of frlands and associatoss*

Thus, Wi)I2S/i-ilOKdR stabod in his diroot oxamiiiation:

Qo "Thon it vrould suroly havo baon iioro suitablo to
giro up such an offico?
Ae "It v;ould havo boon moro suitablo if I had not be
lioY-od that in irsy offico I could do far moro for

poaco than I could havo dono on tho outsido#"

(Tr, pago 8097)

T1y3 samo sontiinsnt is oxprossod moro spocifically by the
dofondant sonowkat lator in In-s longthy diroct oxamination:

fv
•f

"I think that r:Ty ontiro emotivity can only bo undorstocd as anontity', as avdiolo. Undor a totalitarian

forn of govornr;i3nt, it is inpossiblo to carry or. and
v;ag3 wcor against tlio rogimo in all sphoros and in all

subjoct nattors Y:ith oqual forcoo As I said, ny strugglo was djvotod to poaco, and it took all mjr strongth,
all tlio strongt]\ that I had availabloe In addition to
that, you havo to rorumbor ry v/ork for tho rosistarjco
novjrotit, and both tIios3 v/oro o.malganatod in oiyj

strugglo for poaco Y/ithout ilitlor «««
(ir, pago
854 6)
In connoction with tlio chnrgos of spoliation in Fra.nco
brou^it against him, "WJilZSASCKjlR usos tlio samo oxplanfttion:
my

" •,«<» ^"lay I o.dd that/oYm soIf-appointbd task was to
put an ond to th^ Y/holo thing, to holp bring tlYO vrar

to an ond, but not to try hopoloss or unsucoo sful
patching up of symptons and vra.sto nysolf in this nan-

nor^"

I

(Tr, pago 3321)

Apparontly tho brutal and unprocodontod porsocution a.nd
oxtornination of nillions of Jovfs was, in "•llZSK^CYJR^ s ostiination,

•Iso a syraptom of tho war -

dospito tho fact that an activo anti-^

Jewish policy vrc.s from its very initiation an intogral prxt of tlio
Hazi movomont vrhioh WiJIZS^iilCICdR sorvod and roprosontod.

1) soo diroct oxamination of vcn Itossol (Tr. pago 9553)
After tho wcx broke out, Ifr, von Woizsaockor omployod only

ono phrase or slogan which ho passod on to tho so rnmbors of t]-io
rosistraico movomont* This motto was: 'poaco is possible only
without Hitlor',"

-s-

In respect to the Jewish problem he stated;

"

...As far as the ethical side of these incidents

is considered it is
on that, but I knew
the course ttet was
be stopped only by

unnecessary for me to say a word
that the awful development and
taken in the JeT/ish problem could
cne means, peace - that is a

peace eliminating Hitler, and it was this objective
that I centered on. In order to retain that sphere
of activity, in order to ^in that final and ultimate

objective, I have to permit documents to pass my desk
which in normal times I would have hesitated to touch
with ray own hands, you would not even touch them with

a

mir of pliers(ir, page 8388)

" I think I have already nade this amply clear. As far
as I was concerned, it was always a higher aim and

interest'- which was of decisive importance; that is,
to work within the office in favor of peace and in order
to overthrow Hitler's regime, because without peace
and without the overthrow of the Hitler regime, the
Jews could not be saved anyway."

In addition to these astounding proclamations of inner

motives and " selfappointed tasks" the defendant, as will be sho\^n,
also wishes to establish that he collaborated closely and was even
1

connected with bona fide and known resistance groups.
Thus, "resistance" was, according to ^IZS?iEDKER, the
cne and only motive for his entire official activity durino the Nazi
period. However, these repeated assertions and the great accumulation
v

of statements and allegations presented by '.7EIZ.SAECKER's friends does

not make the actu'l nature of his alleged oppositional activity c
any more comprehensible. These varied and often controdictory claims

do not HBke a tangible pattern - they confuse the issues rather than

reveal truly mitigating factors, not to speak of intentions or even

%

actions which could tend to explain the tremendous hhstorical and

fe-

judicial guilt of this man.
In this brief , we shall try to analyze

the factual con

tent of the defendant's claims in the light of 1he evidence before
this Court»

^6-

2a

The Mab.iro of tlio Evidcnco

The Prosecution bases its case mainly on irrefutable docunonts found

in the fLles of the German Porcicn Office rcvealinrr the terrifying story
of countloss thousands of murderodj robbed^ and hur.iili?.tod people of an

entire continent , whereas Herr von VifEIZSAEGKER bases his ex'ta'avagant

defense claims almost entirely on the vague statements of a small group
of close friends, former subordinates and colleagues#.

It is easy to imdcrstand that resistance activities in a police
state are no matter for tlio r/ritton rocord^ HoiTevcT, it is less

conprehonsible why none of the ma.ny ivitnesses nor the defendant himself

have ever publicly mentioned Ernst von hllZS/iECKEIUs rcsistcnnco prior to

this trialp Surely, the fact that Hitler's esteemed State Secretary for
Foreign Affairs actually plotted the downfall of the regime represented
by him Y/ould have been a revelation, especially during the immediate

period after the war when a sliockod world opinion tended to hold the

entire Gorman people responsible for the atrocious crimes which were

committed in its namo# Prior to tee opening of teis case, a number of
r

bonks and articles had appeared on the Gorman rosistance -and a variety
of claims, often substantiated by prominent Allied diplomats, had been
r/.
made by German suvivors#
Yet, never before this trial was it ever claimed
that :^/EXZSAECICSR had more than a most remote and passive connection Y/ith
the anti-Nazi conspiracy^"1)

If this defendant was novor before this trial linked with the now

wc'll-known historical facts of the clandostine ciyosition to Hi tier witein the Eeicr^ he obviously is now bent on utilizing these facts for the
purposes of his ovm defense.

It is strange indeed, that von VHSIZSAECICSR

or his "resistance" group did not reveal a single new detail about the

l) Of four serious books vhich appeared after the v/ar on the German
resistenco but one mentions him onco. Teat is Fabian von Schlabrondorffs
"Tl-ioy almost killed Hitler", Schlabrondorff relates that" he visited
hTliZSidXKER in order to receive information as to the situation on -the

Eastern .fTont (p. 1|.2), No reforonce to VdlTZSAECICHR's resistance can bo

found in Dulles, "Germany's Underground", Gisovius, "To tlie Bitter Wd"
or Rudolf Pcchol's 'Deutscher Fidcrstand". The referenoos to VffilZS/iECKER

contained in tee (Uaries of Ambassador von Hassoll will be analyzed later
on in
Rothfcls in "The German Opposition to Hitler"
ofers tn -.PJ^SAoCKER ti'dcc (pp, 60 and lk6) but only in connection
-7^
liuxw.k.r.^

•M

German resistance but rather attached themselves meticulously to those
events and persons (alimys dcad)3 v/hose deeds are today y/ell-knovm to
students of recent German history. Neither did von VlilZSiLECKER mention
one yvord about his alleged resistonce activitios as witness before the

H'lT or to the Prosecutd^on in this case prior to liis indictment,
It is interesting to note, that the other defendants in this trial

yvho T/ere connected adth the Geman Foreign Office did nothing to support

-^IZS-xiCIQ.:R!s rosivstanco claims, but did, in fact, poltitely but armly
disassociato thonsolves from bfSIZSAECKEk's extravagant allogations, :ihis
holds true also of the defendantsEElDi-tlNNSDORFF, RITTEU,
STESNGIl.GHT and BOHLE who worked closely with "."SIZSASCKBR for a number
of years.

The record further shows that b'EIZSAEGKER while testifying on his
own behalf seemed to know far less of his own 'irosistance aciivitv"

than some of his dofonse witnesses v/ho constantly brought out now aspects
never nontionod by the defendant himself.

Iho 'tevolations " of Hitler's one timo State Secretary carefully
geared to well-known facts and only made as ho sta-nds accused, snack of
ox post facto Gons-cruction, of a falsification of history Tfhich can

only discredit the much discussed claim that thoro v/as such a thing as
a sincere, honest and really active Gorman opposition to Hitlor, is

Lo-d lansittart, who, whatever his political views dn regard to Germany
may be, is a British gentleman of the highest repute and who has been

for years in a singular position to observe dovelcpnonts in Germany, de
i

clared:

7

"An attempt is being made to build up an un

i

warranted legend, which in the interest of
. *•.-

if.

history, must be refutod" (Pros.
T>i_
n/-,i \
NG-^786 ii., Doc, Bk,
20h)

C-65 A,
'

Close analysis of the evidence prosentcd reveals that hHIZSAECKERis
;vi'

f.

'Vcsistance" legend is primarily propagated by a small but most co

herent group of minor officials of the Gorman Foroign Office, All these
mon ov/o their careers and promotions to the State Secretary von '•'SIZS..ECKER
and wore^ like their chief faithful servants of Hitler's Reich to tho
bitter endt
^a-Ofr"

••••

•-

-H

.

i,/'!
V

I t is of interest to the student of criminal cases how this snail

group has banded together in its efforts to fortif3- a n^rth of ^7hich they
alone benefit to the detriment of the najority of Ihoir countrymen "who
endeavor to restore the confidence of the -world in a better Gemany,

Garofully plannedj their affidavits and testimony corrobato and confirm

each otdier, thus spinning a cobweb •to, the end of obscuring their own
collaboration with Nazism and the guilt of a man vdth v/hcse prestige
and standing they feel bound to identify themselves.

Studying the

numbvor of affidavits each of those men gave to the other, one cannot
help but havG the impression that this group wishes to lift itself out
of the mud into which they follov/od Hitler by its own bootsstraps as
the legend ascribes i t to Baron lixmchhauscno

In order to show the

real nature of the mutual insurance association of affiants, the

Prosecution has called tiie most prominent for cross-Gxanination,

Ihe

result made it clear that those affiants supported each other through
V'.-:

affidavits given for denazification purposes, exchanged

affidavits

for mutual information, and used similar methods known in many domestic
K\'

criminal cases.

The attached chart shows, that one 6f this grouj;^ defense affiant

Herr von Nostitz, admitted to have issued 35 o.ffidavits in exchange for
9 end that ho had discussed his prolific output with the witnc>ssos von

ICcssel,

Erich Kordt, von-^tzd^rf, Siegfriedi and others (Tr. page 18424.)

The witness Sonnleithner admitted giving "about two dozwn affidavits",
far exceeding the group which, of coHroe> helped him speedily through the

ST)ruchk^mm:?r

(Tr. page I8480). Herr von Bintelen stated that he H^hought

f--

it his dr.ty"to execute affidavits for his former collegues (tt. page 17.559).
Thie is not the plao.e to study the history of the Kordt claim

of "re

sistance" by having warned the British- 'cvernment prior to the Munich
agreement. However, while Kordt had often before asserted that he ac-fced
"on behalf of the German opposition" it was not until this trial that he

claims to have acted with V/ElZS^lSaKIR'b crneent,. It is known that the
Kordt brothers also executed a staggering number of affidavits in ctrier to.
help.their colleagues before the courts.

In addtion. Ken* von

sUnimoned

in his defense a numoer of persons who may justly be

called survivors of the Dona fide Gerim-n resistance and

widows of active participants who were executed by the

GestapoV This brief will deal with the actual facts con
tained in these aifidavits and teste'monies in their pro

per, Ho\jever, an attempt to find an explanation for the
phenomenon! as to why proven anti-Nazis have gone to the

very limits of stretchijag the truth to make sta^ments on
behalf of

seems part of the analysis of the

evidence as such.
The Prosecution is not lacking in reverence

and sympathy for these valiant women whose husbands

lost

their lives Decause they, too, fought Hitler. They fought
Hitler from the inside, v/ithin the totaliticirian state, a oattlefield no less dc^rigerous tha^n that on which tens
of thousands of Allied soldiers gave life and limb.

However, the very nature of that struggle

against totalitarianism in which these men engaged made
discretion and utmost eaution imperative- Here lies the

great difficulty in truthfully assessing the historical
facts of that struggle - these facts, the ever guarded
names of their associates and secret contacts, the very

extend of the conspiracy - quite frequently died with them.
Those matters had to be kept even from one's spouses and

dear ones; from them in particular, for they would be easy
prey for the Gestapo and its cruel methods to extract

information. 1)

An now ,for the first time ,these widows

claim to have known i t all t

1) .m/-.Sa1X:KiR*s own son testified to this effect; in re
gard to his father's rel.;tions with the resistance move
ment ha said: "Details about actions in that field were

not told me b^ him oacause we did not want to incriminate
each other by knowing what the other did." (Tr. page
^10^*

"•••hi

10033)

. '-if.

Tho motive for their readiness to rally
to the defense of '•••/^IZSA5?CK:n^(
such survivors

- and this also applies to

of the German resistance who have testi

fied for the defendant - c.an ha explained by the-psycholo

gist rather than the l,;wyer or historio.no ' TlZSrtl?CK"^j
by virtue of his uackground, -and upbringing, is being
considerad a man of . integrity in certain German circles®

Could it be that those who likewise belong to that parti

cular group of unaoubtedly honest patriots feel accused

themselves -and desply hurt by the charges brought ag.iinst
this m-an? Since they will not grasp that one of their
own social set lent himself to cover and participate in
the vulgarities of the mad paperh.:.nger, his actions are
r

being rationalised as having stemmed from the clandestine
^ .S'.

inner motive of secret opposition. Hera is a straw for

their comprehension. j\n6. every personal association, each
casu.,1 word of complaint about the difficulties' of the

work of the State Secretary, now
wishful thinking

-

-

in retrospective

is enlarged and interpreted as

"resistance''.
In addition the follov/ing should ho kept in mindj

III contrast to

Riohontrop's hrusque, arrogant and even crude

nanncrs.

s smooth, conciliatory, and diplomatic

hearing has caused numc'rous persons to v;rongly assume that this

exterior meant more than tochnique, namely, a basic difference

with the Poroign Minister in political views and political activitioss

The best evidonoo that this was not the case is

s record, his sigraturo under the most horrible

documents, and not infrequently, his reports containing cynical
comments or self-congratulations on his success in deceiving

the partners to diplomatic conferencos or conversations, through
this techn-iquo of manners. {See trial brief covering crimes
against tho peace)

standards .rt.iv.jlied iii Aaalyaiii/^ th^ lihrXdence
In order to analyze the defendant's "resistance", this brief
';Vill let itself be guided by three prerequisites v/liich are con
!/•••

sidered as vital as thejr are obvious for the internal struggle against

,1

the totalitarian Nazi regime.

l>'( • •

nov/here specifica3.1y set dovm by students of the German resistance,

2ven though these prerequisites are

they are recurrenuly implied and historians will agree, that those

courageous Germans, vdio justly claim to have opposed the Hitler
govem.'ient and suffered because of it, have been possessed by them.
These three prerequisites are:

1) A political philosophy, v;hich, whatever it ma;" be, is
clearly and honestly opposed to the phi].osophy aiii
ideology of Nazism.

2) Active intent to remove Nazism froru pawer and influence
by revolutionary action or active participation in,
incitement to, or preparation for such action.

This

wouldusually, if not necessarily^ include political
planning or preparation of a policy v/hich is to replace
tiie removed one.

3) Active prevention and/or sabotage of such measures and
propaganda I'fhich riiade Nazism what i t is.

1

A good many if not all members of the historically acknowledged

resistance groups in Germany a3-so considered it a bitter necessity
to hasten the defeat of their countiy in Vifar because they arrived at

the conclusion that only Gerr:iany's military defeat could bring
about tlris collapse of Hitler's regime#

..

'J;

"•'j'SIZS.ASGFISR's political philosopliy

No clear indico,tion of •'iEIZSAECICER's political philosophy
can be discornod from his testimony or that of his friends o

He

vdshes i t to be understood and considers it a matter of course

that ho detested Nazi practices^ ("oe« it is unnecessary for me
to say a word on that"^ Ti*. page 8588),

But what he indicates of

his views in a positive sense docs not support any indication of
ideological opposition to the Nazi regime.
At the very beginning of YJEIlSASCKER's direct examination ho

lordo some sta.tomcnts which apparently are to bo token as his politi
cal credo:

"I didn't prefv.r any constitution.

A constitution,

as far as I am concerned, is not a confession of
faith. I imagine that a constitutional monarch is
that v/hich lies closest to the German chara.cter«

$

But as a civil servant, one docs not S3rvc a con
stitution, but the Fatherlands ) One serves which
ever government and constitution is given to the

country by the pooplo. 2)if

7595)

The following day the defendant s^.ve a further clue as to his philo
sophy:

principle and alsc; my political confession of
faith has rd'ways boon that I should not intorfojTo

with destiny axy more than nocossaiy;

that is, tiiat

evcrytliing that is good and capable of life shoulld

be allowod to gro;/ without interference and tlio way
should bo cleared for it.

That is obstacles should

bo removed, friction should be removed, and para
sites should bo removed, and ^voods should be up
rooted, and then we should let evcrytiiing else look

after itself."

(Tr, page 7711)

This hardly sounds as the political conviction of a man who risked
f

his life in secret resistance.

The fact that ho applied this passive

philosophy of "laissoz fairo" to Na.tional Socialism is - inadvertent
ly - admitted by himself:

1) This sentiment was often oxprossed by the late Dr, Goebbels in
bcriding the Weimar Constitution which the Nazis dostroyodo

2) This tacit admission that Hitler's was a populary elected govern
ment is in contrast to the historical facts as presented in this
casoo

-13-
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whother or not one v^as enthusiastic

.. lonal Socialist ideas," (Tr^ page 8095)

In his direct cxoiuination !iEIZS.\lCIC:a testified on thi tension

^ting betvroen Gorrci-any nnh Svdtzerland by reason of tl^ persecution

Gxisi

of the churches .•^nd

fV\r^no

• .
..
discrimination
of the Jews which was practic

ed by the country vidch he lOirosontod. He stated:
Pbotit Hf

nn-i-

•

^ could do anything fundamental

n "

myself in ny personal relations, did

Ur. Pago 7601)

to criticize Jev/s and churciimen*"

the mm who nav claims to have been connected with

persons .Yho advocated the violent overthrow of Hitler, was, according
to his o.vn testimony, appalled by violent change or oven revolution*
Ids son, the physicist, Karl Fricdrich von Woissaockor, cites a
remark wldch his father made to hm:

He ^eid to me at the beginning of the war - aid
quot^g literally: 'My ovm father said on the

n>

,

_

f i r s t nf

AurmoJ-

-V •

•

..n,, .

WKKii

XLiUllWi.

.

"-/ii

...

OiLJ

• M
V7ar v/ill
a rovo u ion
; I foarI9I4
that "Tliis
this war
will ond
end with
oven worse',"
Cfr. pa.go 10021)

The tenor of such a passive attitude runs throughout his testimony
and more quotations uo this effect mil be cited in this brief in sub
sequent contexts,

iIEIZS^lECICER's lack of political judgement quite evidently stems
from the lack of political conviction, at least vis a vis the Nazis,
fhus, tilGlZvjiUiiCiHRj according to the tcstimorQ'" of his friend, Erich
Kordt, supported the symbol of Gorman nationalism, Field Marshal von
hindcnburg and thought that the Nazis would bccomo more moderate after
tiioy had attained pov/or over Germany:
He thought by a combination of inside and outsido
orcos a gradual chang:: might be brought about in

the suructuro and ho thought that the officials
shoidd all bo on the alert and should try to do

'

their best." (Tr. pa.g^ 732I)

It is quite evident from his ov;n testimony that at first,
IffillZS.'iEGIlilR failed to sec the rcvolutiona.ry character of National
-ll^-

} '

ir 1
• •

1

'

Socialism but once it became appaxent was willing to condone and

oven support it in line vdth his own cl:iauvini3tic aims for a greater
Gcrjiiau.y• 1)

One of his remarks v/liich wore recorded in the diaries

of the murdered ambassador von Hassoll boars witness to this

attitude*

On Hay 24^ 1940 Hassell wrotes

"Since National Socialism^ as it has now developed^

is completely souUossj its intrinsic creed being
powcr^ vje shall get a godless nature^ a dctermanized,
culturoloss Germany, .ind perhaps a Europe, conscience-

loss and brutal*

iJElZSfkEGICER thought thore w.as some consolation in the

knowledge that very often in history great transforma

tions have boon wrought by criminals.*,."

(NG-5759, Exhibit 288 Doc Bk no 204a)
/inother indication of the cfefendant^s attitude during the Nazi
period is gained from a. personal letter vfhich he "wrote to the German
ambassador in Japan, Ott, in Hay 1940:

"If the daily routine or even artificially piled up heaps of
paper did

not keep us busy, we would for the moment

be rather unemployed. For every forward step that the
AXiaQ'" is j;iaidjag in the V/est is far more significant from
a foreign policy point of view tlian .anything that we could

ever accomplish i»vith our pen -jid paper work... (NG-5406,

Exlaibit 3608 D.oc Bk No. 97G)
B'."
r-

Tills is a personal letter to a trusted friend who according to V/EI2SAECK.

mha own testimony (Tr. p. 10180) vfas not a Zizi. Hho letter certainly
v/as not written to irapress .anyone vid"bli Nazi torminology or to comouflague
tho vxitors' true feelings.

Nowhere throughout tho defendant's testimony-or that of his

friends can we read that he ever attempted to dissuade anyone from

folloidng Nazi doctrimcs or policy or that he ever tried to win anyoaa..
oa'er to the cause of the anti-Nazi opposition, which he claims to h.ave

represented. On the contrary, TOZSAEGKER'S public speeches and

utterances closely follovrnd the Nazi party line.
In contrast, tho actual members of the resistance saw their main

1)

I^iEIZS.USCKER's scurrilous and nation-olistic language in regard
to Poles and otiier "traditional eneioies" of Germany revealed
itself too frequently daring the course of this trial, both
in documents and his own testimony to be cited here in detail*

Thus, during his ovjn testijnuiiy he referred to "Polish arbitrary
acts*., of a Fascist ch-aracter" (Tr. page 7746) cuid "Polish
excesses and breaches of contract*.*" (Tr. page 7750)
-15-
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task in attempting to win support among their countrymon and in
opening their eyes as to the true nature of NationoJ. Socialism,

Both the witnesses von Schlabrendorff -nd von dem Buscho emphasized
this aspect of their activity

(Tr. page 10972),

Von dem Busche

claiins that the State Socrotoxy, in a public speech before 100

young officers in Potsdam in the spring of 1942^ once implied that .
"the foreign policy of Hitler v^ould not lead to negotiations with

foreign povjer vdiich would preserve the state" (Tr, page 10975),
It must be remembered that the German officers never wonted to

negotiate until taeir entire country v^as overrun in May of 1945-? As

is well knovnaj they believed firjidy in "final victory" and were
indoctrinated with the creed that if Nazism was to step dov/n from
the vrorld scene not only the German state but all of Germany should
also be doomed,

I'JiijiZSj IGK-jR^ who now claims ho had to remain in office in order

to give information to the secret anti-Nazi resistance, did not do
anything to enlighten his ovjn friends about the criiiiinal aspects of
Nazi policy,

Tlio cross—examination of Theodor Kordt revealed that

"t'JP-lZC/iECKEU did not give him any advance information on Nazi plans
for aggression - notably the invasion of the Western countries in

May 1940 —or njiy information that could ha-ve been used to strengthen
the

of the anti—Nazi resistance such as the deportation of the

Jews or tho atrocious activities of the Einsatzgruppenj. (Tr, pages 12300 - 12305)0

iten in tho spring of I940, Bishop Bergrav of Oslo came to see

'l(JElZ3..nl3KjH on a peace r:iission, the State gecrettaiy allegedly

expressed his distaste of the Nazi regime and, the horrors of w.ar.
Despite that he did not see fit to draw the only consoquentia]. con
clusion from such an attitude to inform the Norwegian that a Gerruan
snoak attack against his country.

-16-

IS*''

was planned wittin a few

(Tr, page S^kO)

The undisputed fact that Bishop Bcrgrav called on ^®)I23;JEC!KER in

March 1940 is again confirmod in an cffidavit by the Right Roverond

Bishop of Chichcstor., George K«

Bell^ introduced by Defense in rebuttal

as Exhibit 454 (V>ElZS:Ji:ciCER Docuinent 497 Doc Bk No, 9.

The affidavit

states in this connection merely that VIEIZS;J5CKER "accoptod it (the
peace proposal) for use as a possible means of peace talks,/^d
hero the story ends® Neither the affiants nor the defendant himself are

able to t;sll us vrfiat was done .about the peace proposal of these chorch—
meno Obviously, the reason is that nothing at all was done by
1'JEIZS;1KKER beyond having accepted a document on behalf of Hitler* s
government which at that time was still making efforts to come to terms

with England as is evidenced by Hitler's speech before the German

Reichstag of 6 Octobgr 1939,
.'ilElZB.DCKEE's lack of consistent political attitude is also
emphasized by the fact that, despite the recurrent and accumulative

statements as to the reasons why he remained in office, he d'id or so he
states, offer to resign repeatedly:

Question (by Dr» Becker):

"But as you yourself purport,

you several times offered your resignation?

.\nswer (by V'iEIZS^iHJICER) s "Yes, I did, simply in order
to m-ake it clear that I was serious in cy opposition to
Hitler's policy#

That was necessary.as a demonstrative

act of protest." (Tr, page 9441)
Or, did we not hoar ad infinitun

that the State Secretary's

Nazi activj.ties, spcochcft, rxid oven his SS-mcmbership vrere means to
camouflage his resistance?

vSpooking about the SS unifom ho stated:

•'Perhaps I might have worn this uniform in order to

serve jy political intention rather more effectively,
but I did not do it and I just could not face wearing

such a uniform as comouilage•»" (Tr, page 7699)
9

1)
RW;

&-.V.
rV'<,

.According to ;Hon

Dulles (Op. cit., p,. 59) and other

sources a number of G^^rman .nnti-Nazi conspirators thought it
their higher patriotic duty to warn the Norwegians (-and later the

Dutch and Belgians) of the impending Nazi invasion.

2) "Dokui^ente der deutschen Folitik"
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Clo£!o study of ViElZS/dilCICIlR's tostinoay nd. that of his friends

rove-il hiiu as a nan^ who^ concurrent vdth his lack of reaa conviction^
is oxtreniely concerned vdth his ov/n

personal safety®

He constantly oiiiphasizos and rationalizes^ the need

of being covered in eveiy direction - he has lils rooms checked for

secret nonitoring devices (ViElZS.JiCKER Document 337^ Eriiibit 257 p.B,5) «
and ais statements a.rc always so guarded as to be open to any number of

interpretations. It was fear of indiscretion and the resultant danger

to nii.iself v/nicn caused his quarrel with aiubassador Hassell. (NG5759> Exhibit C-2SS Doc Bk 204a).

In spite of all aJLleged difficulties which ''iElZS/i^CKER claims to

have had with his minister von Ribbentrop there is no evidence that
there was ever an open, clear rift between the two men.
/

Tlio saJ:io is

true of course^ of his relationship with Hitler hiaself viho - suspicious
and erratic as he was - vrauld have hardly permitted ViElZS^U^CICDR to

remain in nis high office pnd^ Ir.ter^ to represent him at the Vatican

until the end hao. he not trusted him cojipletely.
At the ovo of tne second 17orld vfar^ vfhcn the invasion of Poland
was iivaenent^ ffilZd'^CIiER made a statcjuent to his son who asked him

why he didn't appeal to Hitler as a last attempt to prevent the
cat;\strophoj

however^ if I tell him tho truth^ naraoly that ho
destroys his own Reich if he starts a war, then he
Q-'^y thinks I nn
(Tr. page 10020*)

This man claii;is that ho wa.s convinced that this Wrar would develop
into a world conflagration^ that Gormviy <uid tho very essence of
Europe ^uld be destroyed... he holds all the factual md reasonable
ax'gui^ents in nis hands - but is afrcid that a man viion ho claims to .

have despised may think him a coward. No otho?;- than that very
designation c.an be said to fit® .ind this is hardly consistent with
the stamina .md courage required of a nan of the "resistcjico",
.ffllzaJX^KER'3 complete un^.villingness to use his pov/e-r and
influence to alovlo.te tho cruelty .nd h:,rdship of tho system .vhich
-18^
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he reprosuntGd oven in individur.1 instances of persons Icnom to him

is illustrated, in on affidavit by Dr» Johannes LiGchtcnstoin (NG3053j Exhibit C-287 Doc Bk 204A)«

Drs Liechtenstein relates in detail

hovf VJEIS.VECKER refused to involve himself in any way in aiding a
Czech nationalist ^vho was once useful to the No.zis but was subse

quently charged vdth resisting the Nazi authoritioso
The incident reported by Liechtenstein is not surprising in
view of the jiany documents vrfiich indicate the brusque and callous
manner in which VJEIZSiiECKER rejected the nunsrous humanitarian appeals

on the part of Lo-tiU-./jaericoji neutral diplomats

and of the Papal

Nuntio

l/EIZo.'^CKEH's coiuplete disregard of huj-ian suffering ojid the
horrible realities of the Nazi atrocities are indicated by his
f

statement that he could not remember whether or not ho had read the

bloody Einsatzgruppon reports oven though he acknc^lodges his initial

on most of thonio (Tr» page 857S)« The obvious fact that these sadistic
accounts .?.re bound to bum thomselvos upon the mind of any humanly

responsive person is evidenced in the record by the spontaneous remark

of the defense witness Bruns who, asked about the Einsatzgruppen reports
oxclairaod:

'♦No,

I renenber thorn so well and I shall never forget then".
(TI o page 18469)

In fact, it is hard to see how VJEIZS/XCICER actuplly expects us to
accept as facts his oft-alleged "resistance" activity.

For his own

a

accounts quite frequently reveal /most detached attitude even on matters
of the clandestine underground struggle.

Thus he replied to the legi-

tiiaato question of his cross—examiner as to whether he over con
tributed jioney or goods to the resistance groups; "I don*t think sOn,,

I don't know, but you must ask my wife." (Tr# page 9237)

§J
1) See Exliibit I465 (NG-40CCL, Doc Bk 50); }jbchibit I467 (NG-

4864, Doc Bk 50); end Jibchibit I469 (NG-4862, Doc Bk 50).

2)

See .&±iibit I468 (NG-451S), Exhibit 2133 (NG~1757)j

Exhibit 2136 (NG^'4459)> >tciiibit 2140 (NG-4533)> Exhibit

a41 (NG-5004); Exhibit 21/^5 (NG-4444)> Eichibit 2152 (NG4569), Exhibit 2155 (NG-4572).
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'®lZSiji£)KjilR and i.iost of his frionds^ aithough professing to bo
onorjies of tho Nazi crood arc talking about the horrid Nazi

atrocities as though they were nerely on paper - providing an
interesting basis for laore or less congenial arguments on the

baai.e for j^iore or loss congenial arguments on the meaning and
interpretation of documents - as though in fact no massacres and untold
suffering had ever tal^en place in grim reality.
If \iiElZ3/j5CKER revealed himsolLf at all in tho course of his

cefonae, he revealed hijusolf a.3 a man without any firm ideological
basis who accepted ovon the most cruel manifestations of Nazi

Ideology in order to better serve the State of Adold Hitler. If he

had any misgivings on certain consequences of Hitler^s foreign
policy they did not and could not consolidate into the firm creed

essenti-al to the revolutionary or political conspirator. For not only
does oEIZS.XClCER lack dotcrr.aned and spiritual negation of totalit

arian concepts^ iiis very deeds revealed him as cynically cold and
devoid of the human ideals v/hich alone could inspire genuine resis
tance to the evil that was Nazism, His complete inner identification
with his job of a diplomt may have lead hij:i on occasion to inform

himself on the opinions of forces other thrm those which he served#

But even n.i.s most personal associations were entirely detemined by
diplomatic and political considerations and subordinated to,the aims
of the State which he served so wello
*

5* Relationship to Bon/.. Fide Resistr.noe Groups

"iVLilliiSAJCKiiR's "resistanoj" olain is primarily based on the

foot that li3 Inuvr and was aoquainbed vdth a number of the people -vdio
were subsequently persecuted or killed by the Nazis because of their

opposition to the Nazi regime.

Tine defendant statedj "The main

people in the (resistance) movements knew that;
v/ith me'',
with tlxe

they were in touch

i.s regards the "main people", we' are constantly presented
5 03in nr.me s i

"That is I was in touch with General Beck, General '

Hrdder, the collaborators of Ganaris, Golohel Oster,
a certain Herr von Dohnanyi, State Secretary Planck,
Professor Albrecht Haushofer, Jr., and many others#"

• (Tr. pages 7704-7705)
As to "tlTe many others" we learn e Isewhe re in the transcript of
4

" .. i"linister Popitz, the Prussian Finance
'{inister ~ who, by tlie v,-ay, also become a victim

of the later plot cn Hitler's life ..." (Tr. page
7917)
Tlie vjltneso, von Kessel, further mentions

" .«oPc.'iulenburg and York he

saw frequently and

Schwerin tco.o(Tr. page 955t;)
Furthermore WJIZSAjJK^jR v;-as, vn ore told time a?id again, in
contact with i.mbassador Ullrich von Hassell and Ambassador Count T/iforner

von der Sohulenburg wlio wore both later victims of the bloodbath
folloTd.ng the abortive putsch of 20 July 1944.

V/dlZS^dOlCjjR*B secretary. Dr. Herbert Siegfried, also states in

his affidavit (W.5IZSAjCKilR Document 337, ilxli. 257, DoOc Bk. 5) that
a nijimber of persons later convicted on charges of conspiracy
against Plitler came to see the State Secretary repeatedly duriiig
his tenure of office.

However, he was not able to make any state me nta

as to tlie nature of tloe conversations which took place#

Considering their official positions, it becomes at once obvious

why tlie State Secretary in the Foreign Office should know them and
^a-

lit-iro conijinuous offioicil ro Iciijions v/i'th. "bhjni wliicli tnciy" hcivo ^ on
oooasionj also mo.turod into closer personal ralationships. As will

ba dascrlbad latar, all thasa conspirators hold official positioiis
in tha Third Raich.

Tha Anti-Kazi conspiracy vms not a full tima

Job - tha official dutias and contcjcts oontinuod.

And for ona

parson, Tidiom V^lZSkAOlUiB. knavr, vdio latar provod an activo Anti-Nazi,
a nundrod parsons Gould obviously be nairiad v/ho waro in ovon cIosgt

contact and w^ro ardant followors of Hitlar, not axcapting Eaydrich

of tha Gasto>,po or Eorniann with whom ha hotd a continuous and ploasant
official rolationship,

iJli:IKSjVjIOKJR raconstructs intimata contacts v/ith a nunibar of man
•vdioso conragsouB attampt to ovarthrow tha laacbr of tha Nazi stato

was rowardad by a crual daath - but thasa avants took ploca at a tima

whan iGIZSAjIGKjIR was sofa bahind tlia marbla walls of Vatican Oity,
AS his main "contact man" with tlaa "rasistonca" tha dafondant

ola.ims tlio raystarious ohiaf of tha German Oountar-Intalliganco
Sarvioo (Abwahr), Admiral WiHiahji Canaris.

not unusuo.l that tha Stato'-SdCrotary

In timas of war it is

in tha Foraign Offico should

ba in continuous contoct with tha hand of tlia Military Into lliganco
Sar\icao And tha fact, that thaso Contacts wara cordial is oxplainad
by th_o provarbial curiosity of tha admiral ns wall as by tha foot,
that thasa gantla^iian, according to Wj!I23Aj;cm's tastimor^y, know
aoch other wall from thair timas as NaiTy officars^ Obviously, thaso
contacts would also axtand to tlia Intalliganoa chiaf's aidas and

particularly to Dohnanyi "vdio is closaly ralatad to tlia ona tima

intalloGtual alita in Garmany from vdiich tha dafandant himsalf stoms.

Tha avldanca prasantod by tlx? dofansa shows olaorly that tho
contact botwaan 'ffdIZs/.JCm and Qanaris was ontiraly on official

tarms, Tha affiant Gottfriad von Nostitz ("WilZSAilCKilR Doc# 269,
ilxh. ^67, Doc. Bk, 5) statas that this contact, as wall as tha oon-

tcct with Gbnaral Haldar, was ostablishad "for tha purposo of mutual
dl.-

information" and usually maintairod through tha Sootion for Military
-22-

Affairs iri the Foreign Office. Iirhen the head of that Section, von der
He7den-R;ynsch, was later on transferred, this contact continued to soue

extent throu^i personal visits by Canaris and his aide, Lohnanyij, And

Erich Kordt states: "There was even a special official apipinted to keep
contacted."

(Tr^ pp. 7350)o

One of the few surviving members of Admiral Canaris' circle, Erwin
Lahousen, also confirms "that there was cooperation between Canaris and
SAEGICER". Canaris, according to Lahousen, kept VJEIZSAECICER informed about
actual developments in the various theatres of war. He also informed VffilS-

SAECICER about the many other projects and "enterprises" of the military and
political leaders of the Third Reich of viiich we had learned^..WEIZSAECKER
on the other hand, allegedJ.y emphasized reports from abroad to the effect
that there would be no peace with Hitlero

If there was ever a modern case of Dr. Jelcyll and iir. I^srde, it is that
of the "littile Greek", the Gliief of Hitler's ItLlitary Intelligence Service.

For the man who organized the Nazi Fifth Columns, who, in the last war, in
troduced the weapons of murderous sabotage, secret infiltration, and sent
German soldiers on death missions also, so we are told, permitted individual

officers of his organization, knovaa as "AbsT/Thr", to plot against the regime.
This sr-range fact was first revealed by General Lahousen during the trial
of Goering et al, before the IMT on 30 November 1945» Essentially the same
facts are made kno^vn to this Tribunal in -the first affidavit by Erwin Lahousen
VvEIilCAECICE'.R Docujxent /|.6, Exhibit 272.
The nature of Canaria^ resistance to Hitler were revealed by Lahousen
before ^>he DJT in the follovdng words:

Q.-

(by Colonel Amen)

"What was the purp^jse of the

group to whicn you belongod; that is Canaris' inner
circle?

A.

(by Lahousen) "On its political motives or aims,

I was not iri'orinede

I can only reiterate the

thoughts and considerations \vhich I, since I was
ore of Canaris' most intimate confidants, knew well.
His inner attitude, which influenced and moulded
not only liy ovjn actions but also those of other
men whom I mentioned can be described as follows;

"We did not succeed in preventing thi war of
aggression. The war implies the end of Germany and

of ourselves, a misfortune and a catastrophe of veiy
great extent.

However, a misfortune even greater than

f^his oa.tastrophe v/oiilu be a triumph- of this system.

To

pr-j-vent this by a.3.1 possible' Jiibansyyas the ;ultimati.e aim

purpose of our struggle,"

(luT,Vol,ll, p,"' 444)

i

The difference "between the "basic attitude of Ton WEIZSAJIGESR and that

of Canaris is striking^
friend Oanaris.

^iZSASCKSa o^bviously did not go along v/ith his

To wits

("by Dr. Becker)

"Kov: in the meantime, did you

try to sa"botage and v;ork against military prep
arations in d-ermany for the Bnssian carpalgnY
A.

("by TJEIZSASGKEH) "ITo, of course not, "because I
woTold never have had an idea of sabotaging, for
instance, military measures for an imminent cam

paign in any manner,

I tried to prevent that

caznpaign itself but did not try to stab the G-erman

soldier in the backc"

(ir, pp„ 7899).

And on the follovj-ing page of the transcript we find WBIZSAESCKSR^ s state
ments
not

"oBoI did/want to get my country defeated, Wiat I

did want was peace, and for thab purpose, eliminar^
tion of Hitler,

But I did not desire bhe defeat of

Germany in order to do away with HitlBi'c " l)

(Tr,

pp. 790C).

And during the defendant^ s cross—examination, we hoards

Qr.

(By Dr< Kenrpner)

%ere you in touch with the

Batdi, Belgian, or Trench underground movementsT

Ao (By >CE-IZSAEGKIEIR) '-Ho, that is quite a different
sabjectc

My resistance woric was directed toward

internal conditions^

I did never endeavor to pro—

mo'-.o the defeat of Germany^

I would never have

done thato'^ (Tt. pp. 9234),
The claim of Canaris' widow that ItEjlZfiATCOE and her husband were *^ound

together by the same political phlloeophy and the same concern about the

anticipated disastrous course of the war"^ (WIZSABUECER Bocrument 253, Exh^
273, Vil'IZiiAlilCKEP, B., "B.> 5) is thus refuted by "WEIZSABGOIR* s own testimony
both cn direct ano. on ci*oss examination,

lahouLicu, who did nob mention ifSIZSAHGKHiR during his testimony,before

the

mugt have also felt that mere coutact with Oanarls vrould not uphold

WElZi-iAEOiOlK* s resistance dalmsu In a second affidavit introdaced on be

half of V-ilZ^iAECKlIR, he therefore, adds that ^'.o.this exchange of information
was to enable both gentlemen better to brief the opposition grot^js with which

AA-QSAS.aii'tL^aa'Lt^

I'."'

l)
%Ar

E-ifetur.fe cf_.th^sj|LtT3a(tlj^ii_wi,th XS^^Qt jfcq_

Students of the German resistance tell us that numerous other German
anti-Hazis shared Oanai-ls' view that Hitler's triumph would have been
far worse than Germany^ s total defeat^. Boring a secret choroh meet
ing in Geneva in 1941 the prominent German theologian, Dietrich Bonn—
hoeffor, statedS
pray for the defeat of my nation^, Only in defeat

can we atone for the terrible crlmos we have committed against Burope

and the world"-, (Bulles, "Germany's Underground "5 page 116), Also other
true Gbrman resistance fighters realized that military defeat alone could
v.i-po out all traces of ITazisci in their oountrye,

'frt Wnt-

Ti

the eliraination of Hitler which "both parties desired^^

ment 47, Exhibit 274. ^IZGASGKEEl

(VJEI2SASGK]jia Doca-

B(. 5)«. However, this claim etands as

more conjecttire as TiBIZSAEJOiCER or his "^gro-up^', according to his own testi—
mv:»ny, nover had any plans of their ovm for the elimination of Hitler and,
if he gave inlormation to the ever onrinrLs Caneris, this does not mean that

he knew at the time for what purposes this information was to he used»
Before the

Lahousen also testified that Oanaris and G-eneral Oster

secretly collected docnnients incriminating .ts-, the Hazi leaders which were
to "he used after their elimination to indict them before a conrt and the

Grerman pec^le»

This information is also contained in the book by Hans Bernd

(risevius 1) and confirmed by other sources.

One of the defense witnesses of

WEIZHAEGKER, Tiktor Brims, in an affidavit (iVEIZa^EGESR Doconent 15, Exhibit
258, tvEISS^GKER E, B. 5) uSefi this pattern by-stating that he assembled, on

orders of Erich Kordt, in the fall of 1939, incriminating material against
Hibbentrop v/hich v;as added to the collection of such material kept by G-eneral
Oster,

ViEIsaAEaiQH was stpposed to have had knowledge of the fact that such

material v/as being collectedr

He might have known that Goering and A3.fred

Hosenborg also collected such material against Eibbentrcp without using this
fact later in their defense.

In rebuttal the defence yet makes an^^ther attenpt to use the mystery
srxrounding the diai'ies of Admiral Oanaris,.

In WSIZSAECKER Document 503,

Ejdilbit 467, ®I38AECKER D^ B, 9, the affidavit of one Sonderegger, wo are
told a complicated story, the essence of which is that possibly WEIZSAECKEIR,
trgethor vrith Oa'iaf-'is.> may have given a warning to Yugoslavia prior to the
Germsji invs.aion rf bhac c^mtry.

This vague conjecture is all the more

fantastic-in view of the defendant's own and many protestations that he would

have never committed treason or done anything "to stab the German soldier in
the back. "

The same affiant also states that he had rooess to ^'A st-ody by General
s

Hans Ostor on a planned 001:5) d^otat against the Hitler government* and that
this document mentioned 1@IZSASGKER as a possible ^pointment in a postHitler government^

Ho admits, however, that during his interrogations Ostor

never mentioned "KBlZSAECaCSP.,

It is utterly inposslble for anyone remotely

aqgu^int^d_vdth the. mont^it_y of_'t^e_Haz4;0_to bell.ev^ jth§t_V^IJS4B0K^_wnii^d

1) Hans Bernd GiBei?iuo, *To the BittfSP End-'.

have continued to represent Adoli' Hitler abroad if, Indeed, his
name had been discovered cm this or any other documont of such
treasonable character*

If to elaborately prove a connection betv/een the Chief of

the Military Intelligence Service and the State Secretary in the

Eoreign Office means laboring the obvious, the same must be said
of such a connection XTith the Chiefs of Staff of the Gorman Arcy»
Wo arc told time and again that close personal relations existed

between von WEIZ3ASCICER and General Beck (Affidavit by Drc Hans

Spoidel,^ ^TEIZSilKGICER Document 21^7, Exhibit 276,^ DoB» 5) and, later,
with his suoGossor, Gemal Franz Haider* V/o sl^alL deal later with
the Haider putsch plans and the defendant's connecticns with thera*
If the relationship botvreen Haider and WEIZS/JSCiCdR was intimate

and jpersonol bcj^cmd their official contact, maintained by a
specially appointed liaison man, this can be easily explained
by the great similarity of background and interests of those
tWQ' men*

ijnbassadora von Hosaoll and von dor Schulenburg, who lost
thoir Urea after the 20th July affair, arc of the sane age

group of diplomats as the defendant* Their acquaintance v/ith the
luckier oolDeaguo^ wlio> become Ribbontrop'a Stnto Secretary, is
V

fi

neither unusual nor a matter of special merit for ITEIZai'iECIsER*

• — V.

Haf'soll QTid \7}ilIZSti"J30ICER, initially dose friends, bocai:io

estranged later because Hacscll v/as disappointed about the
reluctance of

to join the aiiti--Hazi resistonce*

HasBol.l^s. diaries, excerpts of which ore being inti'oducod aa
rebuttal ovidonoe by the Prosecuticai, oCLaarly rovool that the
rift bet\7een these tv/o men v/os not due to thb carolosaness of

Mrs, von Hosaoll, as the defendant wilL have it (aoo the affi
davit of Siegfried, Vffilza/iEGKSR Docuiiont 337* Eadxibit 257/
D*B. 5) , but bocauso ^ffilSSAEOmi did not v^t to get involved
in a conspiracy which was not in aGOordonco with his convictions?.
/lUbaasador von Hasseli felt tliat "the entire oirolo around

I. . •I'

"V* '

'

ViffiIZSk"j!lCI\ER shovja in tho long run luore and raoro tint he is

fundonontnlly woalc and impress ionabloe /jnything that tastes of

action can not bo expected from tUerea" (HosselL^s Di*«aries,
NG—575Sx Exile G-208^ ro-B> 204- A) The facts show tliat von Hassnll
"VTas correct in his observationA.

It is liker/iso neither unusual nor a matter of mitigation

that von lZEI2Si'iE0ICER waa acquainted with the Prussian Minister

of Pinance f Jolitmnes Po.pitz^ a consorvativo who was later
executed by the same regime which earlier deemed irln wortl^ of
the Golden Party Badge honoris, causa^
Among various other names which the defendant i/ishes, to call,

his "ao-aonspiratora."^ tho young Albrecht Haushofer^ a professor
of ixDlitical geography at the University of Berlin, should be
mentionedo

A personal friend of tho murdered Albrecht Haushofer^ Rainer

Hildobrandtj states in his affidavit ('rffllZSz'iECICER Document 229^
Exhibit 2li.9^ D> Ba- 5) thc.t; in Ilaushofer-s opinion, WEIZS/iEOICER
was- justified to. remain in office because ""only a person who was
near to Hitler could do something docisi-vo in order to remove him"'»
UTlIBSiiECICCR himself wont to great length to explain that ho was

any-.,hing but close to Hitlere. General Haider in his affidavit

(TTEIZa/EGKEK Bocunent iiij-S, Exhibit 270, D* B. 5) quotes 'vVEIZS/iEGiCER
as tojJdT:ig h:jn ''tha.t he only saw Hitler very seldom"«. In addition,

cl this brief will, show, "VilillZSi'dilGivER failed his murdered friend
Haushofo.r- in the expectation that he vrould do aoraothing "decisive"
to remove Hitler*"

lilldobrandt further states that liTEISS/iECKER made it possible

for Haushnfor to "dopaft quietly" for Sv/itaerland .to enter into
s^ocret negotiations* The reason for iVBXZHABOiGSH^ffi efforts aoem
hard to understand since a few lines above we i.eam that "'in the

spring of i9^h1 Albrecht Haushofor went to Switzerland with a fon-ial.
oxder issued by Rudolx'' Hess" - no one less than the Deputy 'Puehror'
-27-
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at that tine. \Jq never heard anything about the disposition mad©

of the so'-called "peace plan" which Haushofor handed to ¥BIZS^iECI^ER»
cl

Undoubtedly s^Areiy brilliant nan vrfio foresaw the doon which Hitler
vrould bring about at a conparably early date, Haushofer cannot be

described other than o3 a dissident Hazi» 1)

Many of then turned

against their Fuehrer at one tine or another until., at the end,

Hitler felt betrayed by then allii. 2) Albrecht Haushofer was caie
of the spiritual fathers of the Nazi drocn and had, in his earlier
days,; served first on Kibbentrep^a and then on. von Papen'a personal
staff. It was at t^iat tine that ho mde the acquaintance of VfflIZ—

Beyond the fact that ^?SIza/iBOKER and Albrecht Haushofer were
on good personal teras, we leam nothing as to the nature of their

connom "anti-^iazi conspiracy". Haushofer's brother, Heins, who has.
never before made any stateiabnts as to his brother's activity

because,, as he told UoS» tntelligGnce officers in the sunanor of 1945;;
he did not Imow anything about thera, now clains in an affidavit

(\IBIZSASGICEH Docunient 4^5^ Jilxhibit 2^6, D. B. 5) that his brotherapproved of the appointment of ^TEIZSilEOICER as State Secretary. Ho

1) In his latest book "Total Povrer^* (How York, 1948) Edtiund A» Walsh,
S>Je., the Regent of the School of Foreign Service in Washington,

D.Co'^ devotes an entire chapter to Albrecht Haushofer, comparing;
him with his father, the famous geopolitlcian. Father V/alsh writes

(page 65): "Albrecht'a crimes, in strict Justice, must bo Ju<igcd to
have been more contributory to. the Hazi conspiracy than those of

his father, since the son played a far more active part in the Nazi
preparations, at least in the early stages, as we must conclude from
his captured correspondonco. But his revolt against the regime
concurred much earlier than his father's feeble opposition, since
we find that Albrecht gave his su£^port to a conspiracy against

Hitler as. early as. 1940, though still luaintaining his political
csonnoctions with the regime —a paradox which c^ne of his best
friends described as. a. "'^Teird contradiction".

:) The motive of Count Holldorff, SA loader and Chief of the Bex-lin

O'

Police, for Joining the conspiracy against Hitler was well sum
marized when he told his Nazi Judges: "We will all. have to Jump

off the Hitler bandv/agon someday". (Pullea., Q.p. Git., page 179)*'
-28-

adda that Albrecht Haushofcr shared with V/EIZSABCICSR his secx-ot

resistance plans^ without^ however^ revealing the nature of these
X^loiis* Inasnuch as Horr Botho von Y/ussaw^ in his affidavit

(v.^EIZEAHCICniR DoGunent 59^^^ Exhibit 232^ D<v B.. 4) x also coxifioxis
that Haushofer approved of V/EIZSi'iECKEH's appointnent to high
offioo, \rG shall leave that fact unchallenged*

According to the o:Cfidavita. by Helnuth Cords (^TEISSASCivER
DocuLiont 149)6 Exhibit 250^ D» B* 5)

Hans Ileinrich Boebel

(iffilZELlSIGKJill Bocuuent 143ax Exhibit 231 >1). B* 5), \YEiaSu\ECEER
figured as candidate for a position in the future Go^xian
govemnont which Albrecht Haushofer wished to see established*

Apparently Haushofer did not deen ^/ElZS/JSCICSa veiy essential in
bringing about of tliat govemuaont for he dndicatod to. Hcobcl that

ho was glad to see the State Socretaxy safely out of the country
as Hitler'a ./uibassador at the Vatioono.

-29-
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69 Active Intention to O/verthrow the Hitler Rogine

iji AnaZyais of the record before this tribunal reveals that
in fact \7EIZSABOIC3R actually can report little nore than that ho
TTaa "'in touch" with sono of the tona fide apponents of Hitler#.
His secretary and friend Toddy von Kesaolii. stated:

L*'

(by Kessel) "Haushofer and Schulcnburg and
York he saw frequently and Schwerin too® More
over they nnintained contact over a period of
seven years tlnrough uy person, \7ith these later
victnis of the 2Dth July#

(by Dr» Becker)

"Bid Mr# von VBIZai'iEGIdiR'a

relations Vidth the resistance novencnt confine

itself to the issuing of inforcation and the
receiving of infomation'E

A#.

"In the beginning, that is to soy before 1938,
that is correct to a certain extent# Later he

becano nore active — that is to say he activated
the forces of the resistance novenent in the

service of his peace policy» i)

That is be

ginning with 1938 and 1939* Still later he
considered his own activity nore and nore

under the aspect of naking contributions to

the resistance novenent> 2)"' (Tr# page 953^)
The sane witness relates the sane evidence, sonowhat nore
clearly later in his direct examination:

"Von YffilZa.iECKER waa in close contact with the
various heads of the resistance groups# Ho Was

friendly with then; ho worked with then; ho

shared the danger in which all these people

lived fron 1937

(Tr# page 9522.)

Inasnuch as tho Gestapo knew nothing of WEIZSi'iECICER'a alleged

1) This is typical of tho vague teminology in which "iJEIZS/iECiCEii
and his friends abound # Wliat "forces"? \7hat does he nean by

"activating then"? Bvory onti-tHasi v/anted peace but thoy were
all violently opposed to tho appoasonont of rlitlor# After tho
Munich ^act Goerdelor v/rote to an iuaoricon friend: "The

dovolopnent of the post v/ooks can only bo called very dangerous «
Hitler and Goering have bluffed tho entire world. But the world
had been v/amed and infoniod In tine# If these warnings had been

hooded and if one had acted accordin£^ly, Gerr.iany would be free
of her dictator today and could turn against Mussolini #••«•

By shying fron a snail risk Mr# Ohaiuberlain has nado war
inovi-ucble ###" (Dulles, Ox?* aiU, images A9, 50)#

2) Beyond the alleged exchange of infon.iation we ore never told
what those "contributions" consisted of#
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"'resistance", even after the 20th July 1944; the dan^jer of which
Herr von Kossel speaks is not too plausible (See Exliibit 3^03

(KG-557Q ; D» Co 97 G> affidavit by Huppeiilcothen,. to be further
discussed later in this brief)# All. this vatnesa soya then, is
that \vEIZSAEOIGlIR was. in contact

- which os. we saw above wos

q.uite official - with the "heads of aertain resistance groups"and that ho was "friendly \7ith then"#. The defendant hirisolf
actually claims nothing mores

"In the suLmer of 1.938 it had bocono clear to

no if an official v/ontcd to serve pcaoo and
his fatherland he had the choice bctvToen

only two woya., that is, to {jroaoto his aius
and ideas, within the state that is to

sabotage the course steered in the directicn
of war or else to remove the heads of

government*. V/ith the neons at Liy disposal
that is politically to redirect the course
tovrcird peace, seemed to ne ny active and
direct port# Those v/ho followed the second

X.)ath, to these men I made myself available
where they nuodod no# That is, I was in
touch with G-encral Beck, G-cnoral Haider
the collaborators, of Canaris, Colonel Ost^-r,
a cerdiain Ilerr von Dohnanyi, State Secretaiy Planck^ Professor Albrocht Haushofer,,.

Jr.., and nary others*."

(Tr* tagea 7704 - 7705)
Ton "HEIZS/HCICEii does not oven hia;^olf claim to have followed

the path of the resistance - ha \7as "in touch";
This fact is oven norc evident if we analyse the statenonta
of the two men who testified for \ffliaSAEGKMl who were thomselvea

actively engaged in resistance activity: Pabian von Schlobrondorff
and Axel von dcm BuschOn.
HV.

The defendant's ovjn roforunco to these tiiVD men is brief and
revealing:
Q.

(by Dr, Becker) "At that time did you
still maintain oontacta w.vth the resistauoe
groups at the front?.

A#,

(by

"Xoa, that too*. I

remember at this time there was a member
on the staff of the so-called Amy Group

Center, in the East, who called on ne*.
The Any Group was subordinated to Field
Marshal von Bockj and a Ilerr von Sclilabren-

dorff oojiio to see mo from that staff and
-31-
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he belonged to that group and he sought
sone political infomation fron ne » Then

fron a regment stationed in the Sast, a
Herr von deiTi Busche cone to aee ne» He

belonged to the sojne group*" (Tr. page
7912)
As

far as Herr von Solilabrendorff is concerned, it tos

pointed out above that 'TBIZSAJilGifflR loiaw nothing -cThatsoever of
his stterapt to kill Hitler by snuggling a tino-bonb into the

dictator's plane* Schlabrendorff net V.IDIZS/'iECiCER on a purely
peiBonal errand which had no. connection with ary political
activity*

Schlabrendorff, together v/ith nany of his friends, wanted
^

to persuade the Gcn.Tan generals to novc against Hitler* Bor that

^

he needed sound political arguments* In a search for these

arguments ho reneniborod his acguaintanco with the State Secrotaiy
in the Poroign Office and wont to see hiiu to swap nilitary
lnforr.n.tion for political* Ho states:

"Both these nen (Bock and Kluge) had no
doubts about the military position of the
Third iieich* What they did doubt was the
position with respect to foreign policy

and the consQq.uencea of a coup d' etat
Orgainst Hitler fron within* Bor this reason

they wanted inforr.iation and judgments on
the political situation frcaii an official

personagOa This pcrsona.ge I saw as. Baron
von wlillSSAEOiCElR: and for this reason I

wont to see hin frequontl;^'" during the war*"

(Tr, vjagoa. 1.0536 - 10537)
And what did Herr von ^ffilZSi'iECKER tell Schlabronr.1.orff?

"I rei:iei:iber that Baion von 1/EIZ3AEGK3H in.

describing the political situation again and
again onp)has.ized that peace with Hitler was.

ir.ipossible for Gen.iany* A proreq^uisito for
peace v/as the overthrow of this nan*"

(Tr* page IQ536)
"'«** Ho went so far as to extend his thesis

'na peace with Gen.iany with Hitler',, to.
include 'no peace for Gerr.)any with Ribben—
trop)-*" (Tr> page 10557)
And in order to realize this obvious fact, which was clear ta
-32-

every politically interested ^Derson in the v/orld, including

Hitler and Hibbentrop thaaselvoa (7^0 never TTonted to negotiate
peace) ^ WSIZS/iEOICSli had to remain in an office T?hich he claims
was distasteful to hin» "To go oven sa far"' as to infoixi an

acquaintanco in

that no decent government would negotiate

with RibbontroiD can hardly bo regarded aa a resistance activiiy*
We liavo already dealt with von den Buscho'a claim that
Y/EIZSAEOlvER indoctrinated 100 Geman officers during a publia

lecture in the spirit of resistance to their Supreme Oorinander»
^vTlIZS/JilCICHIR had no connection v;ith or knowledge of von don

Busche^a plans to asaass-inate Hitler.. The v/itncsa; a family

friend ot the defendant^ moroly states that he approached
V/EIZS/iRGlCER in May of 1943> shortly before he v/ent to the
Vatican, in order to be advised as to whether i/EIZS/iBCICiStt would

prefer a milltajy dictatorship to a temporary civilian aOmini—

stro.tion mder a Reich Council.. idillZSj'JilCHBR^ hovrovor, "v/aa
sceptical of both these solutions, because the choice of p.e2>aonnol wou3.d moot with some difficulties with regard to their

recognition by the presur^ptive victors" ^ (Tr» page 10977) • This
T/as to moon that the Rwssiana would not care "from the knowledge

of the 3nter:ial. nature of a dictatorship" to moke any pronounoononts and the \/estem Allies "would take a long tine before

tbcy a':jl^owlc3.god the connections or recognised them".
(Tr? page 109/S)
If \ySIZSitEGmi had intended to actually take part in on

anti-^Iitler conspiracy and had he not been "'sceptical" of the
solutions, it offered, fee could have used his stay in Ron as
Ajabassador to the Vatican ta good advantage to infora:i the

/aiies of the intentions and character of the personnel which
the resistance hod choson» He did not make any such attempt nor

v/aa he ever approached by the anti-fl!itler conspirators, them
selves to make it.. Atter.ipts. to seoret.ly infoaxi the United States
-33-
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aoverment of ttie persons who took port in the later conspiracy,
of which IffilZa'JilGiuiK loiew nothing, were successfully made by Hans
Semd Gisevius and others

, but not by any of "iTSIza/iSCKER^s friends*

The ^contributions to the resistance noveLient" of v/hich

Horr von Kessel speaks (supra) and v^ich the defendant himself calls

"total ros-'.istance" are interpreted by the witness, von Etsdorf,
who also furnished an affidavit (V/SIZa^iEGICEH Docunent
Exhibit

Dc D. 5)-^ as followst

"Von VfflIZSAEClCSR*^a conspiratorial part could only

consist therefore, in his making felt his spiritual

authorily by again and again furnishing new argu^-

ments to the military which would urge then to take

the plunge, to start acting. For the rest, he could

only remain at readiness in order to stap^ into the
gnp, if the government should be overthrown

(irc page 3.6iQ)

It still ranains doubtful whether '.ffilZS/iECKER, who made nc
leading

oiiorts to spealc to any/general other than Haider since the out
break of the war, was conscious that the information Trfiich he

exchanged was used to convince the goneraOa "to take the plunge"*
At best, then, \7EISSASCKER* s arguments and "spiritual authority'"
were used,

did not use thejn* He passively romained in touch

with some persons, who might some day replace the Hitler govern
ment so that ho would not bo left out, so that he also "might
step into the gai^". This v/ould be a far cry from any intention
on the part of ITEIZaWiaiK to overthrow the rogimo*

For hop^ could ho hope to accomplish a change of regime if
"ho did not favor Civil. V/or in Gorr.iaiy" as Erich Kordt admitted
(Tr. p* 7517 - IS).

This actual absence of any real intention to act ©gainst
Hitler is admitted clearly by the defendant hii.iself;

"I waa of this opinion from the summer of 1938 on.,
that WQ could not in the long run preserve peace
with Hitler^ That is w^y I considered resistance

1) aoo Allen

Dulles, Op* cit*, pages 133 i'i'#
1 .
' V . f
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neoesaaiy^ The main people in the novoments

Imev/ that, they were in touch virith ne# I
advised then, but I, nysalf, 01.1 not the nan
to carry out violent actions of such a nature*"

(Tr» page 7708)

.
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V/31I3SA!5CI{SR did not state -

or at loast not convincin.'^ly or

imi^licitly — that he v/as opposed to Hitler or Hazlsn per se or quite

simply "because, as a resistance pamphlet distributed in Gennany early in
1943 stated it, ",o.today every decent German is ashamed of his govemmout," Nor did he feel he would put himself in his anhiguous position
so as to ''reven.-^e and to atone'' as is stated in a resistance manifesto

of 18 I'e'bruary 1943.^) VJEI3SA3CICER considers it "resistance" the.t he
came to the o"bvious realisation that peace would not "be preserved with
Hit?-er at the helm. He himself gives the answer as to why he v^ishod
to delay vfBv,

"It was the prevention of war, which, according to
ny opinion at that time, woyld ha.ve„Qenafc__.the^Giid_.

p^f^Geraany;^" (Tr, page 7695)
IVRIZSAEOlCESs one of the few men in the higher Hazi hierarchy who

have lived abroad, therefore know the potentialities of .Germany's
enonies and realized that in the long run a war w^uld mean defeat and

destruction. One is forced to conclude, that if he opposed war at all,

he opposed*it not becouse of its evilsbut because he did not consider

it timely, ^It is history that he shared this view ^'rith many a German
General Staff officer and high civil servant (and for a time with Gee-

ring himself) v/ho later nevertheless contributed their best to Hitler's
early victories,

WSIZSAEOyEIl'S actual alleged efforts to preserve the peace

boil down to a variety of schemes, most contradictory in their nature,

which never really in-volve him directly but of which he is claimed to .
have been the spiritual father,

IThe first of these schemes involves the complex diplomacy which
load up to the Munich Agreement of September SO, 1938.

1)

Pamphlets issued by the anti-ITo.zi students who revolted in Munich
in February 1943 - see Eothfols. "The German Opposition to Hitler",
TO
page 12.
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T'TEIZSAECKSR tells us that in line with his ovm 'lesires at that i

tine he wanted an agreenent which v/oiild, hy giving Gernany wna.t she
wanted in the Sudetenland

neke war unnecessaryB He claims to have

drafted the conditions which wore then ;oresented "by the Italians and

accented hy the I'rench and British governments. And even today in spite

of the fact that the world has realized that appeasement at that tine

actually precipitated the wor, VrSIZSASGTCEH stoutly defends what he
claims was his "brain child. (The role v/hich V/EIZSAEC3KEH played in this

significeJit historical episode is dealt with in detail in the Prose
cution Brief on Count I.)

However, at the same tine VJSIZSASC'CBP. alleges to have instigated
an action of private and clandestine diplonr.cy, carried out naitly "by
the "brothers. Brich and Theodor Kordt, which culminated in a warning
given the British government nojfc to enter the agreement with Germany,
which was su"bsequently sealed at Munich. Had the British government re

sisted the demands for the Sudetenland, the brothers Kordt tell us,
and had Hitler ••irdered

war as a result, the secret German opposition

D)
would ha-5'e removed the German war lord."'''

Me are, tlnis, to believe that tiTSIZSAEClCER pursued two policies,
diametrically opnosed, at the same time.

Erich Xnrdt testified at great length that WEIZSAECKER, for rea
sons of his own, desired to counteract the theory that Hitler and
Ribbentrop vrerc only bluffing when they threatened to take the Sudeten

territory by f -rce if they c uld not have it otherwise. It was in order
to counteract the "bluff-theory" that "vvHIZSABCICSR allegedly origina.ted

D' Tlie defendant made it repeatedly clear that he favors having the
Sudeten Germans included in the Roich.

2)

Both brothers hordt have often told their story before but, strangely

enough, they hfive never bef-'-re nontinned VfBIZSABGKEK in connection
vrlth it. Erich Kordt did not even see cause to nentkon WEIZSAECICER
in onnection with the warnings to the British when he stood before
his Denazification Tribunal, ?Tor is mention made of the defendant
in this case in his book "vrahn und Wlrklichkeit". Defense E:<.458

(^.'TEIZSAJldCER Doc. 500, Doc.Bk. 9) refers to information given by
Dr. Erich Kordt to the U.S, Department of State, This information
did not contain any reference to l^IZSAEOICER's alleged resistance.
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the idea of i-rarnin^ the British g'^vernncnt, Erich Kordt stated:

"VJell, ^.fter consultation th"t vre (?) hod with the
amy circles one niominf^ WSIZSAECTCSH asked me vrhother
or not a direct approach could be made to the British
Giwerrjiente. It would, of coursSj be hazardous to put
that thr'^ugh to the British embassy in Berlin^ it should
be done dircctlyo After some reflection I su.'gested that

\-jQ should approach Sir Horace Wilson and lord Halifax,
both personalities whom vre knev; to be of hi^jh moral

responsibility..." (ir*

7380)

The vrarninr"! was to be given by 'I'heodor Kordt, Xfho 'h^as to divulge
Imovrledgo tha.t he \iras not speaking for Hitler's government but for the
Gennnii opposition, and that we urged the British Government to make

an unnistalcable declaration that they meant business". (Tr*, page 7380)
Thcodor Kordt testified that he did issue such a warning to Lord
Halifax on 7 Sontenber 1938 and that he added:

"If a statement, as required should be issued, the
Army leaders are prenared to a,ct a.go.inst Hitler's
nolicy".
Theodor Kordt also insists that ^^SIZSABKiOBR originated the idea

of such a warning and implies that he v/as in agreement with the plan that
the v/hole affair was to lead up to a military putsch under the> direction
of Haider-,

But Haider^ in his affidavit, (VTSIZSABCICSH Boc. 145, Ex.270 Doc.3k.
5) states:
form

"Wich von Witzleben's Imowledgo I used this occasion to in

von WEIZSAECKER in general terms of the military plot which had

been plam-ied by von Witzlebon and myself and v/hich as is well knovm, was

only mrevcnted by Chamberlain's and Da.ladier's visit to Munich", If von
VEISSASCSuEH originated the idea, v;hy did Haider have to inform him about
it?

On the contrary,. VJEI^SAEOjCER.. far from strengthening Raider's a.nd

the other general's determination, added to their hesitation and va

•»
, i> I

I'j'

'

cillations by ranlying t., Haider's qaestion ns to Hitler's intentions
"I dnubt that he himself knows as yet", (Haider affidavit, V/EIZSAECICER
B.ic«145, Sx. 370 Hoc.3k, 5)
According to Erich Kordt, the nutsch plan was little more than

hypothetical. It was deduced by Kordt, and v/hoover else may have been
involved in this affair, th'^t there might have been a putsch, it was
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hoped thnt there ifould he one;

"V/hat w-uld he the situation for Hitler? (if the
British had heeded the v;arnin^ of Then ICordt and

nade a strong stand,) Ji'ither he had to retreat —

that was an attitude v/hich, hardly, dictators
have survived for a long tiie ~ or he would go
on with his plans. Then we crmld hope for his
overthrow, with the assistance of a part of the
army,,," (Tr, page 7381)

And, according to Erich Eordt, mzS--.BCI2S hiitself was douhtful
tha.t such a putsch was actually to tahe place. He was most reluctant
to see Germany plunged into civil war. Asked in cross-exnnination
vrhether V/EIZSAHCICER v/ould have done everything -jossihle to aid the
putsch, Kordt replied;

"He preferred peace to war. And therefore he vreis
certainly not against the putsch^ Perhaps he
doubted a little "bit whether in the end, the gen
erals would follow us.

Ci.

"In other words when you nade your efforts to
have the British follov;- your advise, VffllZSAECICEH

himself doubted whether the generals would act,

and yet you expected the British ennire to follow
this advice?

A.

"Exactly,"

And in contrast to Kordt's hopes at the time that Hitler would
not be able to survive the loss of prestige inherenb in a retreat

duo to a pu:blic_^British announcement of determined opposition to

I'

Hitler's aims (both ICordt brothers stressed repeatedly tha.t the British
statement should be uublic to impress the German peo-ole), V.CEIZSAECKEH
tells his son;

"My father said at the tine: 'Ifhat I would have to try,
and v;ha.t X try is to get the British and the Erench

to tell him (Hitler) clearly but not publicly, that

they would enter the w^r - not publicly, so that he can
get out of it without any loss of -orostige because, '
he said, ' no one is so demendent on -arestige as a

dictator'".

(Tr. page lOOSO)

I^hile the Defense v^as unable to supmort the Eordt story with any
evidence other than the testimony of those themselves Involved, the
Prosecution has introduced a document, si.pied by I'/EIZSiBCICER, which
substantiates the close cooperation between the defendant and the Kordt

brothers,(This 'oersonal letter, addressed to Theo Kordt in London, is
marked for the personal attention of Dr, Erich Kordt prior to dispatch).
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Hov/ever^ the ai m of that cooperation is far different from that v/hich

thej now proclaii^. Far from working against Hitlers aggressive design
on CzechoslovaL^ia VJEIZSiECiuSa malces British non-interference the sing

qua non for further German-British relations;

''Your arguments as to what the English would have to do
in respect to Czechoslovakia is in complete accord
v;ith what I would say in the same position. As to more
general German-English discussions, you too can of
course not take a completely negative attitude in London
and dash the hopes of these Englisiimen •'.;ho entertain
hopes for such discussions. I ^hquld^

Uie point, that without settlement__in the_ bLirnjuig Czpch „ _
proble:^_there_co-:M__b£ no question qf__disc_u_ssions ^looking _
further aJiead._Kiuidest regards and Ke_il _hntleri_yours

"(signed)" hEIZSAECia:R (NA25S3, Ex. 80 Doc.Bk. 3 A)
Thus Lord Vansittarpf^ s statement that he did not gain the impression
that the Kordt's "really intended to take action against the regime or

that they were associated \^th any persons or groups who would do so"
(NG-57S6, Ex. C-65 Doc.Bk. 204) merely confirms v/hat is already con
tained in the record.

The Defense has gone to great pains in its rebuttal evidence

to challenge the credibility of ohe former British Undersecretary of

State (see lidiibits 332, 46O, 46I, 462, and 463 contained in t/EI2S.\ECI2SR
Document Book 9 as hJEIZSAEGICER Documents 40?^ 513^ 51A-, 515 and 516)Tliis is surprising in view of the fact that the Defense initially re
lied heavily on Lord Vansittart as a vri-tness to one of its major con
tentions and first mentioned him in this case.

In direct examination the Defense "witness Erich Kordt stated in

connection with the a3-lsged warning given to the British government
prior to the ilunich Agreement;

'HTe got in touch vdth the then First Diplomatic Ad.visor

to His I'lajesty's Government, Sir Robert Vansittart "
(Tr. page 7395)

During cross-examination the Prosecution inquired of tnis Witness

just how close his relationship with Lord Vansittart was. Erich Kordt
replied that he saw Vansittart personally on "fice or six occasions"
(Tr. page 755B).

Q, Had you reason, through your interiaediaries viio arranged

this contact, to assui'Ae that VarisittaifeA vjould regard
you as a competent man of the German opposition to discuss
these important policies?

A.

Othervdse I would not have approached him. (Tr.p.7559)
-40-

Theo Kordt, testifying "before the Coninission, went into even
greater detail regarding his relationship with Lord Vansittard:

"I have knovjn Sir Vansittarf, (today Lord Vansittari.) since
i932e Our relationship, "beginning i/ith the surimer of 1938,
until June 1940, has endured all of this time. Since August
1938 vje had; at regular intervals, confidential meetings

I'Thich, on the one hand^ took -^lace with the approval of
Lord Ealifax and .on the other hand with the approva.l of

State Secretary von'Tifeizsaecker, Mutual information of a
•purely

dinlonatic nature, aimed toward ma.intaining the

;peace were exchanged in these meetings which usually took
place in the aT^tnent of Mr, Conwall Svans, 31 Cornwall
Gardens, and a'lso sometimes in Lord "Vansittart ' s apart
ment in Park Lane; or in my o\m apa.rtment at 7 Cadogan
Place,,

The idea of these meetings was to see to it that

diulonatic apparatus of "both parties would cooperate
towards maintaining ueace. The advice that was given
from "bcbh sides at these marticular meebings were only

aimed at one thing: the thwarting of Hitler's infernal
plans, end to prevent Hitler from using the success of
the moment to bring about a world catastrophe at the

same time,''

(Tr, page 2020/21)

ITow, that in his affidavits Lord "Vansittart has stated the

actual facts of the story, the hero has suddenly bocone the villain

and is attacked for his political views on Gemanye Yet, it must be
borne in mind that it was the Defense who stressed that Vr-nsittard

v/as their key contact with the British Government, Thus only Vansittart
was in a position to sustain their contention or establish its grossly
e:oaggerated quality. A belated attack u-oon his person can in no v/ise
alter the credibility of his testimony concerning cooperation with the
self-styled conspirators.

It also does not seen to serve any particular puri:)Ose in this

trial to attempt to rehabilitate the doubtful reputation of the Yordt
brothers. Again the Defense is cleverly side—tracking the main issue,
iFor the issue here before the Courb is not whether two men named

Kordt were or were nob Nazis but ^merely vrhether, v;hen they conversed
with members of the British government, they did so cin_instruct.ion^
The numerous rebuttal evidence produced by Defense

does neither prove nor even mention this. Lord Halifax in liEIZSAH;CliEE
Document 496

453, -^Doc.Bk«10) merely confirms some correspondence

"oertaining to the Denazification trial of Erich Lordt. It does not con—
tcain the slightest hint that ^VEISSAECIOIE, who claims to have been the
originator of the J^onich Agreement.

•~

•, C'/'""
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had anything to do with the con

versations which Kordt may^or may not have held with British officials
at that time.

The BishoT? of Chichester states (l^ElZSASCKER Docunent 497-, Ex,454,
BoCsBk. 10) "that Information came to ns in the United Kingdom that the
State Secretary von V/BIZSABCICSil was opprs ed to Hitler and Rihhentrop
and the '^rzi. policies and was using his official "oosition to avoid

wa-r," The Bishop's further statements do in no way suhstantiate this
claim. ITor are v^e told how and in which way the defendant VffilZSABCXZE.

opposed the regime he sei'ved . "•'hen in the summer of 1942 the Bishop

personally received information on the existence of the German re
sistance movement "by P' stor Dietrich Bonhoeffer he mentioned the
names of Goordeler and Beck and "nemhers of the opposition in the

Eoreign Office,." The Bishop, like other-students of the German re

sistance, Imow v;ell who these opposition members in the Foreign Office
were: Adam von Tro^ufc zu Solz, Hans Berndt von Haeften, and Count Uerner von der Schulonhurg, Heithor in this affidavit nor in his earlier

account of Bonhoeffer's •^'•isit
tommorary Review"

uuhlished In September 1945 in "Con-

is the name of V/HII2SA.ZC-Zi]R mentioned nor any

allusion made to the State Secretary, ^'fhen the above mentioned

cp'oosition members in the Foreign Office were tried and executed by

Hitler, '!'/EIZS---ECICERj v;ho at thai; time was safely at the Vatican, did
not move a finger to helm them,

Dr, R-obert ^u-erst Ulrich ('••/SIZS.-_CICSR

Document 498, Fx, 455, .

DoCeBk, lO) farther enhajices the Kordt story, allegedly backed and

monthly apmoaring in England, Also nuotcd in Dulles, op.cit.

p.117 and Rothfels, op,ci-fc,pa40 pp. Curiously the British Magazine

"Conterpoorary Rovievr" is mentioned else'^rhere in this trial. The "Ta-

resparola" '^f the defendant Dietrich of 14 March 19-04: reads:
"The lapidary statement made by "Contenroorary Review",
"the.t England used its former world mower in order to

plunge the world into two gigantic wars" is to be used
in connection with the further exi^ilanations of this

newspaper on Poland in the most effective way and to
bo highlighted e.s a sensational confession."
(HG-3411 Exh, 1278 Doc.Bk. 13 A)
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sponsored "by V/EIZSASCKHR, on the "basis of "certain very confidential

renarks" made to him by Theo Kordto Ulrich left the German I'orei^
Office in 1935> His statements are contra-dicted by another defense

affiant; Selzan (vrSIZSAECICEF. Document 493, Sxh, 450, Doc»3k„ 9) who^s
statement "I went, to see you (the UeSo ambassador) u^uihoriz^d_b2 ihS
^er:.ianJH'^rei^_Office" was confirmed by Mr. Joseph P. Kennedy in July

1946p^)3ut at that time VSISSA^CICLR was not yet on trial and no efforts
to connebt him with "resista.nce'' activities were then thou^t expedient'?*.

The affidavit by Prau Goerdeler, the widow of the esiecuted resistance

leader (irSIZSAIJGKER Document 503, Ssh^ 456, DoCcBk. 9) contradicts some
of the statements made by other defense affiants to the effect that
VJEIZSA.'^tClCSR' g resisbancG activity was allegedly well known to important

persons abroad^ Prau Goerdeler, however, maintains. that her husband
never divulged the names of his German collaborators. She does not say

whether

a- ••.l" i-• 1'fflIZSASCKSR, v/ho before the wa.r gave "confidential

information" to her husband, is to be induded among Goerdoler's colla
borators. To students of the German resitano© this would be news indeed,

Pollovring this strange and inconsistent side-^ne of super secret

diplomacy — on which history surely has not spoken the last word synagogu-es burned in Germany and Geriimns tortured and killed their
Jewish compatriots on the street, while the ''resistance movement'•*

re

mained silent„ Instead, V/3IZS&3GICER vrent to Paris and made even this

outrage "respectable" by eulogizing the man whose death precipitated
the greatest anti-Semitic progron ever seen in a once civilized country.
Then Hitler mn,rched into Prague and the "resistance movement" remained

silent again, iTo attempt was made before this court to explain this
silence.

The same Edua.rd von Selzam during cross examine.tion admitted that
V/DI3SAEG:.ER was not informed

his secret communications with I-!r.

Kennedy and Lord Yansittart, He believed that rossibly Theo ICordt
might ha.ve told the State Secretary, (Tr, p, 32465)
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The silence of the "Resistance" before and after

Prague is even more surprising, since it was clear to

^

everyone that this was the decisive point in the policy

of the Third Reich*

It vjas at this point that th^ pre

text of uniting all Germans in one big Reich was now
dropped without scruple and the German govcrnmen"'; changed
over openly to a policy of conquest*

It vras obvious that

this flagrant violation of previous agreements V70U'-d never
be tolerated by the Western Powers*

Thoroforo any .resistance

group could count certainly xvith the approval of, or at
least with some political baching from the V/estern Po\^ers*

nonetheless, the

" Resistance ** did not move, and it T.^as

HEIZSASCKER who played a leading role in the diplcsnatic
preparation and in the diplomatic support of this new anc;
decisive aggressive act of the I^'iird Roich*

-
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Ho sooner was the svrastica raised over the nnhap-ny city of Pragae
as the ITrzis turned their attention on Poland, The role which the de

fendant "played in the diplomatic double game which precipitated this
second and most horrible ''forld War is described in the Prosecution

Brief against T.^BIZSABlCICEHi S dealing lyith Count I, Be it just mentioned
here tha.t it seems a matter of incomprehensible inconsistency that the
very sane people, including the defenda.nt, v;ho allegedly urged the
British government to be strong and sh-w themselves unyielding towards

Hitler's Germe.ny during the Sudeten crisis, admit to hrve strongly ob
jected to the guarantees which this sane British government gave to a

threatened and endangered Poland. (Tr, page 12031), That also was
"resistance" — but resistance to the only measure which could still

hope to deter Hitler's Germany from expanding still further.
As the Gorman armies swept across Poland, the German resistance

and the men of peace again remained silent. VffilZSAECICHR, in his direct
examina.tion, even makes an attempt to Gxrolain this failure of the
"resistance" to act during those last days of ueace the v/orld has seen

in 10 years. -A-nd it is this explanation which, the Prosecution holds,

is the clue to VTSIZSAECKEH's enigmatic soul; he did not want Civil Ivar,
u"heaval, or a disturbance of the given order. He worshipped the State

oven long before it became totalitarian and outri^t criminal, he served
it to the bitter end and what he calls his

"resistance" now was in fact,

at best, occasiona.l scruples. The very word "resistance" by definition
moans action,

q.

(by Dr. Becker)

"But this still leaves the question

omen as to why the resistance movement in Germany In
the summer of 1939 failed to opuoso Hitler.

A*

(by WSIZSAECKia)

"I think this question can really

be ansvrercd in a very simple manner. Take the man
in the street. He didn't recognize this frivolous

/in

gamo that Hitler was carrying on. To o-pose Hitler

would mean Civil bar and/this Civil War this man

would not even have knmm what the outcome would be

and whether nations abroad would take part or not,"
(Tr. page 7864)

"o,.(one) would not even have Imtown what the outcome would be and
whether nations abroad would tp_ke part or not." In other words, the

German opposition Cvould not act, once war had broken out, because they
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could not "be sure whether internal upheavals thus created v/ould not he
Used to good advantage hy Gernany^s enenies.

The defendant indicates that he desired a coup d'etat prior to the

invasion of the T?"estern countries, that he was "even consulted" about
it;

A.

(hy VraiZSASCICER) "In October 1939, General
Haider, the Chief of the General Staff of
the Gerraan Ariay once again organized a drive
against Hitler in the event that Hitler was
going to undertake the tTestern canpaign this
winter* I was even consulted and asked ny

opinion. And I ha-d advised that this drive
go into effect because H'~lder, like many

other peonle, wanted to use the winter 1939 40 free of any vrarfare in order to negotiate
for Toeace,

0.

(Judge Haguire) "3y whom were you consulted
or with v/hom did you consult?

A,

(by V/SIZSAHCIOIH)

"My mediator in this quotion

between General Haider and myself was Hcrr von

Htzdorf, I think he has previously been mentioned

here too. He was my liaison nan with the staff
of General Header, ...also with Erich Kordt,"
(Tr. page 7865)
This liaison between the Chief and Staff and the defendant is con

firmed by Hasso von Etzdorf who stated, speaking of the putsch plans
of this time:

Q.

"Did you notify Herr von "WEIZSASCKEH concerning
all this?

A,

"Yesj throu^out these weeks and months I saw
Herr von "IfElZSAECICEJR almost every other day

and I infomed him of ell details of the plans

which were being deliberated on then. In most
instances he used to receive me with the words:
''"^ell, have we finelly reo-ched the stage at
last'? or '^men are the Generals going to start

the fi.iiht?' But finally when vre had to recog

nize tha,t the nagnanimous initiation for a coup
d'etat had been missed and rendered futile,
then he wa.a doswerate because he came to see

and recognize that nothing would now be able
to prevent Hitler from breaking out in the
Vest and therefore the fatal disa.st6r vjas in
evitable and forced to take its course and it

was along these linos that he often expressed
his opinion to me at the time

(Tr. page 9601)

l)

These remarks clearly indicate the passive attitude of the defen
dant. Even according to the doubtful evidence given by his friends

he merely waited for things to happen. There is no indication that
ho urged action as Goerdeler or von Hassell did dontinuously.
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Eilder, in his affidavit (VJSI'^SAEGIffiR Docunent 145, Bxh* 270, Doc.

3k. 5) also assorts that !'/EIZSASCI{ER vas informed of the •Dutsch-plans
at the'time, which in a c-areful reading of this affidavit, however, are
revealed as vagae and nnderterminod.

Just to v/hat extent this entire putsch plan of Eovenher 1939 v;as
seriously considered "by the defendant is amply illustrated "by the re
ference made to this period in the testimony of his son:
"He said at the tine that the All5-es would h'^ve to

put on the brake from outside and from inside the
Generals would have to do it, and he kept in con
tact with both; but a lot of other strange methods
were considered. I remember tho.t my fo.ther occa

sionally used to ask ne:- 'Ca.n't one get the as
trologers to explain to Hitler that he is running

into his misfortune?' ..." (Tr, pages 10022-10023)
In.,V/EI;ZSAECICE?J s'cstinatinn+thc coum d'etat did not cone off be
cause one could not be sure whether the British would actually stay

put and not interfere, Thr.t, as v/e sh-all see, was also the explanation
given by the generals.
But, according to the witness Thco Hordt, such assurances were, in

fact, given. This witness gave evidence thot Novillo Chamberlain himself
in a handwritten letter assured "uhe German opposition that his government

would favor a chr.nge of regime in Germany and would not interfere in a

military sense should a revolution occur. (V/SIZ3A3CICSR Document 470,
Bxh. 333)

Theodor Kordt himself interprets the meaning of this letter as
follows:

"From this statement and from the explanation which

Mr. Cornwell Hv^^ns gave to me it became quite evident
th-^t the British government was prepared to negotiate
V7ith any trustvrorthy German government which would

replace Hitler's government on p respectable basis

and without ^.ny intentions of reprisals." (Tr.page 12068)
"''.rhat information did you give to Comwell Hvans?

A. "By virtue of the instructions which I received
in Berlin from Mr. V/BIZSAHCICSR and by virtue of
the infomation which I received from the military
forces I informed Comwell Evans of the fact that

the friends of peace in Germany Intended soon and
probably still in November, to carry on a plot

ajgainst the Hitler government. The British government

had already probably expected such a report because
the statement of Hoville Chamberlain which I have
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Just quotod seened to have the purpose of assuring
the military leaders ahout the fact that the disorder
v;hich Vfould necessarily result if a coup d'etat was
successful would not he utilized for a sudden attaxk

on the ^festem front. It nrust he renemhered that at

that time ,the Gernio-n Amy and the France—British army
were facing each other without any action taking
place.

"Did you have an opportunity to pass on this statement?
"Through a secret courier. Immediately afterwards

I sent this riessa,ge to my hrother..(fr. page 1S069)
So here then, was a definite answer and assurance 'Vhether nations

abroad would take part or not" (Tr^ page 7864)o •A.nd this official
assurance was passed on to Erich Kordt and to VJEI23AECICEH,
Thcodor Kordt, who repeatedly stated that in these natters ho acted

on instructions from TVEI2SAECKBR, asserted that he assured lord Vansittard:

"In agreement with my brother, I have done everything

humanly possible in order to inform our friends of the
absolute reliability of the word which has been given
to us-"

(Tr, page 18074)

Yetr the actual consoirators never knew about this assurancOe In

fact it is generally claimed tha-o one of the reasons why no action was

taken at the time was that an internal uprising in tines of war would
invite attack from abroad. In all the leng*l;hy testimony given in other

trials by General Haider about the plans for a putsch in November 1939,
the Chamberlain letter is neither mentioned nor hinted at. Hassoll, vrho,

according to his diaries, vras in constant touch with the oppositional

military who considered a putsch, knew nothing of the British communi
cation. 1) 27one of i/3IZ3AECIC3R's other witnesses mention it.

1) Allen Welsh Dulles writes on page 54 of his book (Op.cit,):

'n'^eanwhile Bassoll, through his connections in the Tatlcan,

tried - without much success - to find out v;hether the Allies would

refrain from attacking Germany in the event that the removal

of Hitler and the mzi party led to internal

such assurance was necessary to meet the objection of the mili
tary leaders that a successful plot meant revolution an. that
revolution would open the door to enemy occupation.
Hasscll writes in his diaries on 5 December 1939 that Goerdeler

was told by Haider why the contemplated coup of November 1939

was not carried out. One of the reasons given were; "One Ccamot
rebel if one has one's nose on the enemy"® Ulrlch von Hassell,

"Fom anderen Deutschland", Atlantis Terlag, Zuerich, (Page 106).
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The only conclTision which can he drawn fron these facts is that

W3IZ5AJ1CKER and his friends did not i>ass on the vital infomation of the
British assurance to the actual conspirators. It nust he assumed, therei--.
fore, that the "resistance nan" "WjUZSAJSCSEER sabotaged the efforts of the
true resistance.

Such suspicion seems justified in view of WEIZSABCKER's hlunt re

jection of the peace efforts on the part of the Pope which, as we know
today, were partly inspired hy the German resistance-,

WBIZSAJSC5KER, in a memorandum dated 3 July 1940 and hearing his sig
nature, noted his own reaction as follows: (Esh. C-339, K'G—5610):

"l^hen the Buntio then inquired carefully ahout the German
answer to the Papal mission, I disregarded that part of

the topic and remarked that we are only concerned with
the fullest possible preparations for the war against
England,"

And if Haider indeed entertained any ideas of removing Hitler with
the object of negotiating peace, VIEIZSAECKES did his best to dissuade
him from this plan.

On 14 October 1941 the defendant sent a speech which he made a week
earlier to the Chief of the General Staff through their special "secret

liaison nan", von Etzdorf, In his covering letter to Etzdorf, WEIZSAECEEE
calls the special attention of Haider to the last paragraph of his

lecture. This paragraph reads:.
Among the numerous British documents captured

by us, there is a British memorandum which is very

enlightening. It is dated Winter 1939/40 and deals with the
question of x^ar aims. This memoiandum contains a passage
to the effect that the removal of Hitler alone would not
be sufficient and thr.t if the Germans were to leam of any

plan for a political -jartition of Germany or for the de

struction of Genpan unity, they would rally behind Hitler.

Thus one would have to wait, ly^n^ti)day_li is_sajfe

asjuae_thaj^ a vistiirioTiSjBxitaih_w(2Uid_.t£e^t_u^ 5£iihout_
a®rex lf^she_were in_a_pasitioni t.o_dp. sPjt. If we weaken
and release our stranglehold on her too early, then we
are lost. Then the slogan would no longer be: t.he. 40=.-.
JLtjcuctiop. ^f__Hitiex-^imgnx Jiui. t,h§. jie^txu^tloa Qf_G§r^]^_
hers^l^,__ But the prerequisite for negotiations with
BritP-in at any time is that our military power must re

main intact." (HG-2719, Exh, 3610, Doc.Bk, 97 C)

In so me.ny words, IVEIZSaSCOR made a
two years before the Casablanca formula
_

V

—

—

—

See Eothfels, op.olt.

133.
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effort to tell Haider that in his opinion Britain

would. trSrit

Germany X'fithout Hitler no different from a Germany v/ith

Hitler, Which is tantamount to telling the General: "there is no use to
remove Hitler hut instead we must keen our military power intact". Gran
ted, for a monenti that 1'/EIZSA.3CICSR was in no position to speak his mind
in a public lecture. But certainly no one could force him to publicly

state a.n opinion which is diametrically opposed to the opinion he nov;
v/ishes us to believe he held at the time. He never had to bring up this

subject. And, at any rate, ho did not have to especially call this
opinion to the attention of the very man whom he now clains to have

attempted to persuade of the very opposite vievr.
This admonition to the Chief of Staff if the Hazl armies is also

in strange contradiction to the defendants statement before this Court:

"...All men v/ho worked in favor of peace in Germany,
however, had to wait for his first major defeat, his
first major set-back; and wc knew that it would only
be possible to overthrow Hitler after such a major set

back ha.d actually taken place, because in the eyes
of the German people, from 1933 to 1941, Hitler had
progressed from one manifest achievement to another and

the masses did rot know the symptoms of crisis tha.t
showed up," (Tr. pages 791P - 7913)
However, the sentintent expressed in the above cited lecture, which
was called to Ealder's special attention tends to confirm a suspicion
which ambassador von ^ssell seemed to have had of liTSIZSA-SCIiBR's real

motives in breaking off their mutual rel'-tionship. In May 1945 Eassell
noted in his diary:

"At the bottom of it all there probably lay the fact the.t
the V/HIZSAECKHH grom had taken at face value certain socalled English peace feelers that were really of no consequence
and was nov/ worried lest the vievr that England would not
make peace with Hitler should disrunt their efforts...

(l'TG-5759, Exh. 588, Doc, Bk, 504 A)
HG-3719, Exh, 3610, Doc.Bk. 97 C alone proves tha.t WSIZSAECICSE is
grossly distorting the facts if he claims now that ho preached the

go^el: "Ho Peace With Hitler". It means, at least, that he did not v/ant
to remove Hitler if this was to mean the military defeat of the .fatherland.
In addition, it shows the true nature of the relationship between Hai

der and TVEIZSAECICEE =ind their "secret liaison man", Etzdorf.

In A-oril 1940 V/EIZSAECICER allegedly held a conversation
general, General Hermann Geyer, according to the affidavit by one
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another

Dr. Hans ^eidel (VJEIZSA33CKEE Document S47, Esii, 376, Doc. Bk, 5).
The affiant asserts thp.t TffilZSASCKSE agreed with the General that the

national Socialist regime should he eliminated and to have inquired
ahout the attitude of military leaders at that time. But the dofen-

drnt himself clearly indicates that such talk, if it actually took

place in this form, was merely prompted hy the fenr of military blun
ders. Delating alleged deliberations about a change of government
after the German defeat at Stalingrad, lOIZS^CiCSR stated:

"Yes, there were serious deliberations about that, and
I must add to this that Minister Popitz, the Prussian
Pinance Minister —who, by the way, also became a vic

tim of the later plot on Hitler's life —told me at that
time that there were two German Yield Marshals who had

great misgivings, pursuant to^the Casablanca formula,

as to what would happen to a Germany that was freed of
Hitler, Popitz told me that tliese Yield Marshals desired
that I give then a statement and comment on this question
in writing. As a matter of course, I refused to give any

such written statement. 1) It i-rasn't possible to put that
do\ra in "i^iting at all. However, I stated the.t the queations
put by these Yield Marshals were wrong in nature, there
vras no alternative In existence. With Hitler there was no

hope for peace wha.tsoever. Therefore, we would have to run
the risk and we v;ould have to try it, because o.then>ris^ we_

jtfould be_in a ^tat^ o.f_such utt.er ^zhrausiip.n_th'.t. nobody_
at_all__would_b^ vfilling to t.alk_with us anyin_ore._Therefore_my
t.liesis_was_in favor o.f_a_change iif_regimG.,_but_tj2 r.enal.n_
forc^ful_and_sirp.n^,_bo.th noxally and iihy.si.cally^ ^o_that.
we wo'-'ld still be accepted as a worfH"y •oar^ner_fo.r_,li^—

i^ot.ia.ti.ons_b^fp.r^ the All.i^s„vri.th.in pux oj'^D. c.ouA£.r^» 5)
I said that the revolution had to come in such good time

that it would not be degraded into a form of capitulation.
(Tr, page 7917)

l) In contrast to this extreme caution on the part of IVEIZSAECHER, It
is interesting to note the reaction of a genuine member of the

German resistance, Dr, Carl Yriedirch Goerdeler, Allen Welsh

ijLlles, in his book "Germany's Underground", relates the following
(page 33);

"l^hen a general whom Goerdeler iiras trying to win over
resisted on the ground that it vras easy for oerdeler
to incite others to actions for which he would not

have to pay, Goerdeler is reported to have immediately

written out in longhn.nd and signed an indictment of

the Nazis and an appeal to overthrow their regime, and
to have ^iven this paper to the general. 'I vrant you

to Icnow'V said Goerdeler, 'that I am ready to ta.ke full
personal responsibility for my actions and that I am
v/illing to risk my life in this struggle.' Goerdeler
did so — and lost his life."

3)

Underscoring sapplled,
-50"

I ri'iit

1 T'-fill- III III. I-

1, L,

ini,

•

I ijii.'ii^i

• n-'7rtrrir"i-f

«bl- '

^VSIZSAECICEE's attitude at ^he tine of the Stalingrad disaster is
even more strickingly revealed in one of the Etzdorf notes introduced "by
the Prosecution as Sbdiihit 3611 NC-5413, Doc^Bki 97 C.

This paper is

no±. an official document, not drafted to impress Sihhentrop or other
i^azis with arguments proposed in their own language, "but is, instead,
a secret note written "by the "secret liaison man" "betireen the two "con

spirators", Holder and WBIZaiSCKER. Said Herr von Btzdorf in refund to
these handwritten notes:

"I hoped that the Gest-'^po would not find them..."
(Tr. ne-ge 9638)

This Exhibit 3611 quotes WEIZS^CKER's message to Haider as stating:
"G-lad that the situation at the front will consolidate.

The conquest of Baku will hit the Russians on the head
since it is their main source of oil. The military effort
should not relent under any circunstajices.

"The probloma.tica.l nature of the war against England
"The other side has decided and signed not to make

peace with Hitler* In order t.o change their ninds one
would have to deal out decisive blows. This is hardly

possible in the Middle Eo.st and in Affcica; therefore
the ompho-sis must bo "on the Atlantic and the General
Staff should note this...

"One would have to destroy England's hopes in Sussia
to make them see that the xvar is not worth while. One
would further ha'"''e to make the English realize that
one can talk with us..."

The phrase ""in order to change their minds one would have to deal
out decisive blovrs" is also obviously \CH!IZSA.BOICER's true ansv/er to the
"Hnconditioml Surrender" formula proclaimed In Ca.sablanca in January
1943 which he now claina foiled the efforts of the resistance.

(by Er. Becker.) "In connection with this Stolin-

grad cata-stronhe, in spite of all this, why, then

wasn't it possible for any expansive and signifi
cant oueration to go into action ag^.inst -litler?

A. (by irSIZSAECJ(ER) "It w-s not possible for the
reason that in January of 1943, at the meeting
of Casablanca, the formula of unconditional sur
render was established and proclaimed. It is my
•conviction that this formula which protrac.ted
the war to an incredible decree, I would say

urotractod it for tvm years*" (Tr. uage 7915)
And he ex;:oouds this thesis further:
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".♦•At

V6ry nonont for which the respective per

sons had prepe.red for years in painstaking endeavors,
and to v/hich they had looked forward, at that very
moment, hy means of this declaration all hopes for
political achievements were struck out of their ha.nds

"because what military leader vrould take over the responsihility for brining about a revolution if the

cha.nces th^t he held for Germany weren't any better
or more adveutageous than the chances that Hitler him

self had njijA^ay?"

(Tr. pages 7916 - 7917)

The fact that

is not speaking for the G-erman resistance

with this theory is evidenced by the fact that the majority of actual
attempts to overthrow the ITpzl regime took place after the Casablanca

conference and finally culminated in the abortive putsch of July 20,
1944, Very shortly after Casablanca the courageous attempt on Hitler's

life by one of the defendant's witnesses, Pabian von Schlabrendorff,
took pla.ce on 13 March 1943. (Tr. pages 10547 - 19548)
at best,

Thusylt was fea-r of total defeat and "unconditional surrender" wh^'_

others

Ti/EIZSAji;CKEH con^sne^iheregig^ance eEfertspQf^. This is in striking con
trast to "principles of moral affirnp.tion beyond merely political

exigencies" - "the spiritual forces of resistance" - which S^ns Hothfels,

in his book 2.)^ asserts as the true motives of the genuine German re
sistance.

In order to show that he sabotaged the Hazi aims the defense

makes claims, too numerous to cite here in detail, that Herr von ^iTElZ-

SAHCKSH saw to it that young men, with whom he was closely associated,

were retained in the German ^orcign service. These men were also enga.ged
If.
;«•

in "resistance" - they vrere to /^thor secret information and make con
tacts

with the Allies, V^SIZSAECIlSH himself -puts it this wa.y:

"... Outwardly, towards the outside, we worked on the
tasks assigned to us but in fact, within this organi-aation
one could build uu a

front of one's own.

"...I wanted and Intended to keep the basic stock or
personnel ready for action at the moment when Hitler
should no longer be there. In this intervening -period
I sent people I trusted to important position,..They
had various tasks, ^he most important was that one

snould be able to rely on these ueo-ole absolutely in
our work for -Deace. In the few -points and locations taken

for these reasons alone, it was still -oossible to carry
on interna,tiona.l conversations. The threads could not
be allowed to break.

Hans Hothfels, op.clt,, page 12
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They \7ore the points of support for the couriers

of the resistance ^oTeinent, conini:; from horaet and they
were sources of infomatioUe Through then it ^^.5 -nossihle

to find out whether and when the eneray side night ho pre
pared to show preparedness to negotiate with a non-Hitler
Gemany. These men v/ere indispensahle to the resistance
novenent."

The only place in vrhich these friends of ^TSIZSAZC'CSR In their testi
mony and affidavits actually allege to have sounded out the Allies in
the sense doscrihed hy the defendo.nt ahove was Berne, There can he no

ojuestion that any of them - Kessel, ITostiz, Krauh^.,Siegfried, Solzanr,

Blankenhom,

"^elhagen, Melchers, or vfhatever their names may he -

acted as couriers for the Oerman resistance. Allen Welsh Dulles, who
was, after all, on the receiving end of these activities during the
war, describes his secret contacts v/ith the German resistance in de-

to.il in his hook, "Germany's Underground".

The na.nes of secret couriers

which he mentions have no connection vrhatsoever with these friends of

!7EIZSAECKBH who found pleasant assignments in Svitzerland. The actual

contact men of the German resistance would, in fact, stay as far away
as possihlc from the official German Legation.
We need not go into the allegation which Herr von Kessel and
others made as to their secret contacts made on hehalf of !V3IZSA3CJCEIl.

One of the defendant's own witnesses, ^hoodor "Cordt, antly describes
the Berne atmosphere:
Berne is a small city of one hundred twentyfive
thousand people, v/here, especially in time of war
the dimloma.tic corps plays a particularly imoortant

mart. In this capital of a neutral country most states
in the world, including the pov/ers with the exception
of the Soviet Union were represented by diplomatic

missions. Of__Ci2,urce,_it is_nbvious_t^at i.n_sucli S,
t.h^r^ wa^ o. hu^y_o^cl^i.ngo iif_infjirraaii^n_and__0Tiiriii2n^

beiwGon ihe mi^sionsj,

(Tr, mage lpa75)

"Ho, one actually cannot speak about ne.gotlations in
the strict sense of the word. I h'^ve already mentioned
the fact that these ne/5:otiatians had come to a stop.

As serious negotiations as those with Mr, Cornwall

Svana never again occured."

(Tr, m?^ge 12277)

Heithar the alleged negotiations nor any of lOlIZSAEOICEE's
attempts to sabotage Hazi ailas came to anything

other

in contrast to his

continued and ceaseless efforts to further these alms In his ovrn field

of activity. In fact, analysis of the evidence submitted to support
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tho.extravagant clains of resistance can only confirm the view of
Lord Vansittartwho

"..always considered, and still consider (s)
Baron von

the chief executant of

Ribhentrom's policy. I can recall nothing

that made me "believe or suppose tha.t Baron
von '^'/EIZSASCI{ER used his position to hinder
these calamitous courses."

(HG~5786, Exh. C-65 A, Doc. Bk. 204)

.
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8* "Hesistanca" at the Vatican
As tha German disaster at Stalingrad -was

followed by tha dafeat in Africa, and a.s the continous
air-raids over Germany removed the hopes for "final vic

tory", the German opposition began at last to take heart
and efforts were intensified. But Herr von

re

moved himself from the scene of action and served the
Fuehrer a t the Vatican.

'j\"^JIZ3a3CKFH now cluims that his decision to go to

the Vatican was also prompted by "resistance" motives. ^el
von dem Busche testified for him as follows:
the

"V'/ell, he said/focal point of German policy
vi/ould be outside Germany and this focal point
for technical and other reasons seemed to be
the Vatdc.an because in the Vatic.-n there were
the missions of other nations with whom one

could have discussions and on the other hand,
there was the supernational authority of the
Vatican which was a tremendous reality in a
period when there was chaos."

(Tr. page 1097S)
The defendant or his friends make no claims at

all of having carried on any discussions vd.th the missions

of other nations in contrast to, for instance, Hans von
Dohnanyi, who was murdered by the Nazia for his part in
the anti-Hitler plot and vjhose vjidovj tells us that her hus

band "was constantly trying to use Roma as a basis to get
in contact with the V-estern powers and with the opposition

groups within Italy". (vmzSAFCKFR Document 291, Exhibit
244) D.B.5)

1) The defense witness von SchlabreMo'rfi'a'.':- in direct exami

nation deplored this movo.' by v/TIZSAFCKFR as a logical
consequence of his previous testimony:

Q,(by Dr. Becker. As you know, IVir. von V'eizsaacker was assig
ned to the Vatican in 1943% 'hat was tha reaction of you
and your friends and yourself to this step?
A. V'/e who tow - Bar on von ^"eizsaecker's convictions regretted
this step very much, as far as our struggle against Hit
l e r was

concerned.

Q, Iiill you please explain oriefly what you have Just said?
A. Baron w'^IZSAFCK'TR in the post of State Secretary for
Foreign Affairs was an important support for the German
resistance movement, 'hen the change in his post came we

lost this support.

(Tr. page 10545)
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Not 3ven during those last hectic days of
and

the war whan Hitlers most ardent followajs broke away/be
trayed their Fuehrer in tha hopa of saving what was left
of their country^ did ^.-FXhSaFCKFR attempt to act on behalf
of his "resistance" and "pe^ce" alms vjhich he now claims

to have persuad all along. It is strange indeed that the
surrender of the German armies in Italy should have been

negotiated with Himmlar's erstwhile adjutant, SS-Obargruppea fuehrer Wolff and a number of othar people.

WFIZSAECKFR, however, who^because of his position at the

Vatican, if for no othar reason, would have been the na
tural and logical choice for carrying on clandestine ne

gotiations with the Allies^had no"% connection whatsoever
with this event. I t saved countless lives and hastened
the

end of

the war•

Tha entire legend of ".FIZSAFCKTR's "resi
stance" so elaborately constructed by tha Defense as a
factor of mitigation for the defendant's conduct is sum

marized in TRIZSA^K^ "^hibit 4, ('.bizsa-ecker Document

169 D.B. lA ) the alleged "diary" of Carl Burckhardt.
Hitler's State Secretary, we are to be believe, was in
reality.-jcot the chief executor of the Nazi calamity in

the fiid of foreign policy but was, instead, the "Talleyrand"of recent German history.

"He came a little closer. 'There is," he
continued, very softly, iona man - you
know him - who is trying to play this

most difficult game 5 he is a German pa
triot and in his way internationally Euro

pean; with adfairable energy he is doing
everything to prevent the war; nobody can
catch him on anything, nobody can prove
anything against him; the only thing which
might endanger him is the carelessness
the naivete, and the indiscretion of the

so-called conspirators
the man I mean,
you know, 'and he whispered, "Weizsaecker;
his .aim is the same as mine - to prevent,
prevent, prevent I "
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Tharo has baan considarabla controversy on
tha admissability of these mamcir^s, Carl Burckhardt's

own declaration of August 27, 1948, is compataly davoid of propar ..authentication. Ha himself doas not con-

tand that his recently written and only partly cora-

platad "Memclns", submitted only in photostats, are
identical with the contents of the "sheets of paper"
allegedly written .;oout ten years ago and unavailable

to this Tribunal. In fact, his own deeLaration shows
that they are not identical but instead are a later

amplification and literary elaboration of the alleged
notesf

.

The Defense argued the admissability of this

interesting historical speculation by comparing it with
the

other original documents which h-.ve been accepted,/kalfor instance,

dor Diaries and "Ttzdorf .notes,/towever, no comparison
is possible because the Haider and .Ttzdorf p.ipars are
complete contemporaneous documents5 the former in Hai
der's own shorthand, the latter in the writer's own

longhand.-

Both are recording frocts and both wore af

firmed by the author in due legal process,. In contract,
tha Burckh..rdt excerpts ,

are his own conclusions

and interpretations which allegedly have a few "sheets

<

of paper" as their basis,^
If
%

I

indeed saw hiiiiself in the role

of a modern Talleyrand all one can say, upon considering
the gruesome sequence of events which have bean un
folded before this Tritaunal^is that - in contrast to

Talleyrand - he remained unsuccessful. But an historical
rnalysis of Burckhardt's notes shows clearly that nei

ther he himself nor the late Fascist ambassador Attolico
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actually ascribad this rola to him. Two facts, allegedly

written down by Burckhardt in 1939 >

not exist at this

time at all but devaibpgiL^ only three to four years later.
Thus Burckhardt sets off

against ambassador von Hassalls"Ha (Hassel) talks and uses

abusive .languagaj ha always wants to dictate to the Eng
lish ...

This was allegedly said by Mussolini's ambassa

dor "In November 193^"

Yet, it is obviously deduced from

the alleged reason", given by •••'TIZSATCKIR,

for the break

in the intiraate relations between von HaaseHand the State

Secretary. However, this break did not occur until April

1942 (-Exhibit C-288, KG - 5759 D.B. 204 A) and prior to
that time the two men were the closest of friends. Has-"

sels's diary, which is most extensive, does not record

that anyone, least of all WHI2i3ATCKi;H, criticized him for
too much talking. In fact Hassall at the time under dis

cussion had just left his post as Hitler's ambassador in

Rome -(he was dismissed in Spring 1938) and had in no
way entered lato the difficult conspiracy which later re
sulted in his

cruel daath.

It is likewise difficult to understand how

Attolico could - on the alleged

date (1939) - he tal

king about an anti-Hitler conspiracy when rill socholars of

the German opposition to Hitler agree that the conspirLacy
did not take root until much later.

Another historical error in Burckhardt's

essay seems the statement that "Prague was already too

much . . . before Prague uVTIZci-iHCKHR also did everything
to persuade Hitler uo adhere to the Munieh agreements."
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Hitler did nor march into Prague until March 1939 Q^d

the "diary" is exeedingly hazy as to the date on which
this remark was allegedly made* The record shows that
W;^IZSA'nX3KHR did everything in hi^ower to prevent the
implementation of the Munich agreement by preventing

the (fJestarn Powers from ratifying their guarantees to
Czechoslovakia*
\

A few lines further down Burckhardt speaks

of Schulenburg and Moltke as misguided anti-Nazi con
spirators* The ambassador Count ^''erner von der Schulen

burg, although executed later in connection with the
July 20, 19^4 plot, was at that time^ when Burckhardt no-bes
^vere allegedly wmttenjenjoying his diplomatic hey-day
preparing for the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact* And if Count

Fritz von der Schulenburg should be the one referred to -

he was, in November I938, a deputy to the infamous
Count Helldorf, the SA leader and police president of

Berlin. The younger Schplanburg's dissidence from
v;'as not
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apparent until four years later® Likewise did Count Hsllmut von

Moltlo's oppositional activity not beooms apparent imtil the sum
mer of 1941

It would have been more than prophetic, indeed,

for anyone to state as early as November 1938 that these two sub

sequent conspirators "can only end tragically," It seems a finrther
contradiction to state of ITeizsaeoker that "lie is the onty one,"
Did the Defense not try to establish that he cooperated closely
with the " move me nt" ?

To^^.y5f€iiiid or no 'Talleyrand', as the foregoing brief shows
what evidence was submitted to show "iTillZSLjlCKilR* s participation

in a bona fide resistance movement collapses like a house of cards
because of its inherent contradictions. The mai^ factual, real
actions of iTeizsaeclor on behalf of the Hitler regime speak for
tliense Ives •

T/hen on July 20, 1944, the actual German resistance struck at

last, vra hear no more about von VallZ&'j-jlGKjlR's opposition or par
ticipation, Following the abortive attempt on Hitler's life

tls

festr.po swiftly moved in and investigated every person who was

even faintly connected with any of the conspirators. The conspi

rators themselves were dragged before the People's Coin:ts and
were executed or imprisoned. Attempts were made by several people

at the time, including even liussolini, to intervene on behalf of
one or the other of the prominent and highly esteemed persons who

were condemned to death for tlieir part in the conspiracy against
Hitler, But Eerr von h'illZSAJCKiin, although he, himself, in the

safety of Vatican City, n5V3r moved a finger to aid any of the men

1) see Hans Rothfels, Op, oit,, p« 112
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who ha now claims wars his -friends and co-conspirators. Instead, ha

continuad to sarva tha same Hitlar whosa vfrath liquidated practically

evarything and averybody that was allagadly dear to him. Had TGIZat that tima, given soma indication that ha, too, balongad

to that othar, batter Gsrmany, it could not have brought him any
physical harm.

Neither of tha two men, still among the living, who partici

pated in tha aDdiaustive Nazi investigation of the anti—Hitler plot, .
have corns across any evidence wiiich would link TiTJIIZSAjlClCSR to tha

conspiracy or prove his participation in tha pracading planning or

preparations. (NG-5405, .Sxhibit 3604,. D.B. 970, and N(j-5376,
\

jjxiiibit 3603, D.B.. 970.)H3 was never char gad with,. nor suspected

of anything - contrary to the affidavit by Schroadar (V/i5IZS/JJCKSR
Document 146, ilxliibit 279, D.B. 5) who is not abla to give ary

convincing details. And tte affidavit of ona Gustav Adolf Sonnanhol,
(Jxh. 266) according to which '.'SIZSAilOKJIR was to have been betrayed
to tlis Gsstapo b^/" Adam von Trott zu Solz collapsed completely under
cross-examination

(Tr.page 18449), If T7j!IZSiliiCK3R would hava had

to fear suspicion oftar it wa.s known that not only ths plotters but
their families and relatives as well wera put into concentration camps

in wiiat ths Nazis called "Sippenhaftung", .Frau von T/j;IZSAJlOKJIS. could
not hava baan so incredibly naivo as to inquire wl^thor liar journey
to Garmany would be welcome. Sciiroedar also tails of an order "by
Ribbentrop to investigate tha activities at tha Vatican Umbassy —
but apparantly no suspicious activity was ravaalad on the part of
either V/jlIZSRjlOFjR or Kassel for naitliar wqs racallad nor repri

manded. Superfluous to say that IVaizsaack3r*s son had to admit
binder cross examination that no Gestapo has molastad ary of the Tfeiz-

saecl<3r»s relatives in Germany, wl-^en after tha July Putch against
Hitler a manliunt started against all anti-Nazis vrho had the

slightest contact with the anti-Hitler plotters.
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But, 3van if vs assume that Schroador's allegation is corract
to tha effaot that

although under suspicion hy tlis

Nazis, was not raeallad hacause it would attract attention "and
ore had to faar that in that a vent ha would gp ovar to the Allies

opanlj''", why did his sons and his properly, avan his files, remain
unmolestad by tlie Gestapo? The Nazis, aftar tha 20th July affair,
did not in tha least hesitate to try parsons in absentia and to

arrest the family members of suspects as hostages© Thus the young
a.nd innocent sistar of one of Dohnaryi^s friends, Jlrich Maria Ver\

mehren, who had gone ovar to the Allies in the fall of 1943, was

arrested and put into a concentration camp©^^ Tha widow of Hans
Bernd von Haeftan statas in the affidavit which she gave for

T/3IZS/JlCKjffi. ("iTjJIZSiiJIOKSR Document 244, Exhibit 2 61, D.B© 5) that
she also was "under arrest for a rather long period and the Central
Goimiiitfcae of Victims of Fascism"

in Berlin has recognized me as

a "Victim of Fascism''V,Tha same was true of the widows and re

latives of a great number of othar a.nti-Nazi conspirators© The Ge

stapo even arrested tlie minor grandchildren of cunbassador von
Hassell, in addition to his wife and daughter, and put them into
Nazi foster homes under assumed names© And Berr "3IZSivjlCESil should

have been spared these crualtias even though ha was under suspicion

By Hibbontrop and tlie Gestapo? (see Tr• pages 9236 —9238)©

T)~Isa~VernBhr3n, "Reisa durch den Letzten Al<t^
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VJjJIZSAjJOICJIR, who salf-rightoously dofios tha sinistor facts
and in dafansa of his criminal tehaviour, axploits to tlia last ths

couragaous actions of othsrs Yfhc gava thair livas for a causa,
which lia navar sharad is thus in sharp and most unfavorablo contrast

to ona whom ha claims was his friand, Alfrad Haushofar* Haushofar

was convictad of ra si stance to the IJaziragima and was murdered
l:y tha ragima which 7i'i;igsAj!CIIC3Il sarvad so wall. But STTsn in his death

cell he contamplatad tha tragedy of his generation and 1:©, whose
deeds vera radaemad by death, realized and admitted his ovm com

plicity and guilt. His guilt was not that for v;hich Fraisler's court

i

hovd convicted him, but:

"ilarly I sav;- tlia misery^ s vdicla coursa - I spolo ny

warning, but not harsh enough nor claori Hov/ guilty .
I

hava'bean I

novr know loera

ly AlbracTit Haushofar, "^Moa-bitor Sonnetta", as quoted by ATlen

•i,

Vr, Dulles, Op* Cit*, page 123,

f

Hi
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APPilNDIX A " Chart shov-ring Affidavits givan and raooivod by
soms m3mb3rs of tl:© vTSIZSiiJJGKilR Groupo
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Schroedor

21583

APP3NDIX

B

affidavits dsalh^g with

WSIZSAFCKER' b

"RSSISTANCE«

^

^

Not all the numerous affidavits introduced on
l^:.

'behalf of Weizsaecher could be dealt ^^Ith in the main

part of this brief.

For just as they intentionally

clutter up and obscure the main issues of this trial
as a v'hole they would merely clutter up and obscure
the histo-nioal facts which this brief attempts to
clarify.

Hence,

a number of affidavits introduced in the

Document Book which the Defense hopefully calls

Weizsaecker's "Resistance" (Defense Document Book No.
5) are "briefly summarized in this appendix.
For the convenience of the Court this a.ppendix

A.

is grouped in four categories:

(1) Affidavits by

what might be called ^ona fide members of the German
resistance or their widows,

(Z) Character affidavits,

(3) Affidavits dealing with the defendant's religious
sympathies, and (4) Affidavits dealing with Welzsaecker's
position as the Vatican.

(1) Affidavits by Wi5:2Zff
Survivors of the German
Resistance

Affidavit by Kargarethe von Ease
Welzsaecker Document 148

Exhibit 275, Doo, Bk. 5

The affiant, states th?.t Welzsaecker had political
discussions with her husband, the then ililita.ry Commander
-66-
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of Serlin,

She

learned from her hushand that the

defendant held a.ntl-Nationalsocialiat views and "did

everything in his power to try to change Hitler's
foreign policyo

Affidavit by Countess Schwerin von Schwanenfeld
Weizsaecker Document

Sxhibit 252, Doc.

Bk.

141

5

The affidavit asserts tho,t Count Schwerin von

Schwanenfeld, an early critic of Hitler, ojid his circle
of friends were "in constant touch with Herr von
•It

Weizsaecker through a middleman, Herr von Kessel, a
first cousin of my husband's".
I t is not difficult to assume that

the

sojne

relationship had existed if the Count had entertained
different political views.

Affidavit by Dr.

Karl Stroelin

Weizsaecker Document 86

Exhibit 253, Doc. Bk, 5

Hitler's Reich did not tolerate as Lord Mayors of
large cities men other than confirmed Nazis.

Toward

one of them, the affiant, Weizsaecker expounded his

well-known but in no way secret gospel that there
could be no pea.ce lest Hitler was removed.

The fact

that affiant used this information to

renew his connections with Coerdeler and to persuade
Field Marshal Rommel to Join an anti-Nazi conspiracy
can, even if we .assume them to be true, hardly be
ascribed to the efforts of the defendant.
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.

t'.

P^^fidCwVit by C3^a3dl;ta von Trott zu Solz
Weizsaecker Document 228

iJxhlblt 265, Doc. Bk. 5
'J^he vldov

of Adam von Trott zu Solz in this

affidavit spends of the high personal esteem in which
her husband held the defendant and asserts that beca.use

of that "it seems almost unbearable to me to know, that
Herr von Weizsaecker.should be one of the main defen
dants. "

%

Affidavit by Klothilde Bruecklmayer
Waizsaecker Document 362
Exhibit 264/ Doc,

Bk,

5

This affidavit, without giving any precise state
ments, reiterates in general terms as information
received from the affiant's late husband the essence

of Welzsaecker's defense.

The affidavit can therefore

be considered as having been dealt with in the afore
going brief.

Affidavit by Hans Bernd G-isevius
Weizsaecker Document 368

Exhibit 255, Doc. Bk. 5
Gisevius,

a member of the inner circle of the

resistance movement which culminated in the abortive

putsch of 20 July 1944, should if anyone, be able to

give rather precise Information as to the defendant's

relationship to an anti-Hitler conspiracy.
since such facts do not exist,

However,

Gisevius gives interest

ing information on the anti-Hitler conspiracy but little
on Weizsaecker,

Particularly astounding is the assertion

that "during a discussion with Weizsaecker which took
-68-
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place in the 'oet;inning of 1943" the State Secretary

explained his three "basic

deas dealing with the

prevention of war which had broken out more than three
years earlier.
G-lsevius considers i t a matter of special merit

that Weizsaecker "protected" Srich Kordt and Consul
Albrecht von Kessel.

The former having been in the

Far 2a,st and the latter in Switzerland and both being

presumably able diplomats it can hardly be s-aid that
these men were in need of any special "protection"..
The affiant draws attention to what he wrote in his

book "To the Bitter End",

However, no activities of

von Weizs-aecker are mentioned in this book v/hlch gives
information on the actions of many other persons.

(2) Character Affidavits
Affidavit by Ferdinand Sauerbruch
Weizsaecker Document 347

Exhibit 277, Doc.

bk. 5

m

The famous surgeon gives a very flattering character
description of the defendant and proceeds that Weizsaecker
was opposed to a G-erm.an invasion of Switzerland and once
assisted the affiant i^hen he was in trouble with the

Gestapo.

Dr.

Sauerbruch "can not understand how such

a decent man ...

can today stand accused as a war

criminals"

Affidavit by Adolf Velhagen
Weizsaecker Document 271

Exhibit 259, Doc. Bk. 5
Velhagen, who was 35 years at the time,

claims to

have exhaustively learned of Weizsaecker's political
-69-
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attitude and secret endeavors during a

three week

period at which he substituted as the State Secretaries
personal secretaryc

Particularly noteworthy is his

claim that Weiasa.ecker treated with "undisguised
dista.ste and contempt

those old civil serva.nts in

the Foreign Service who made common cause with National

Socialism and partly were occupying very high positions,"
The affiant does not conclude, however, that Weizsaecker
suffered of self-contempt.

Affidavit by Dr..

Herbert Siegfried

Weizsaecker Document 337

Exhibit 257, Doc,

Bk, 5

The personal secretary of the defendant in this

affidavit confirms that a number of persons mentioned

frequently during the course of Weizsaecker's defense

came to see him on occasion.
about the nature of

The affiajit tells nothing

the conversations that were held.

It must be remembered that the anti-Nazi conspiracy wns
•t.

not a full time job and that all the persons mentioned

had official duties which vjere bound to bring them into
contact with the State Secretary.

As as well -'known -P

Weizsaecker also entertained official contacts with

Party leaders and ardent Nazis,
In addition the affiant states that Weizsaecker

had his rooms checked for hidden monitoring equipment.

Apparently none was found.

As far as tapping of wires

is concerned, it is common knowledge that in the Third
Reich all wires were tapped occasionally.

The SD or

Security Service, in fact, was initially established

as an inter-party intelligence agency with the task to
si^y on the party leaders themselves.

Weizsaecker himself

used material, obtained through wire-tapping, in the
interest of the Reich.
-70-

Herr Siegfried in this affidavit also brings up

the estrangement between von Hassell and Weizsaeckor.
Weizsaecker ^Ith his close ties to the Gestapo learned
that Hassell v;a.s under suspicion and did not want to

get involved in an anti-Nazi conspiracy which wa§ not
in accordance with his convietions«
evident from the diaries of

This becomes quite

the late German ambassador in

Rome.

(3)

dealing with

Weizsaecker_[s £eli£i2Hs
sympathies
Affidavit by Dr. ilugen Gerstenraayer
Weizsaecker Document 270

Exhibit 243j

Doc.

3k.

5

Gerstenmayer states in effect that Weizsaeck<^r and
his friends assisted in the maintenance of inter-church

relations of the German Protestant Church with the
World Council Churches.'

Such relations were

never

considered illegal by the Nazi state and i t is hard to
understand why this action should be considered "an
attempt to protect the resistance movement against
National Socialism".

Affidavit by Dr. F,

Siegmund-Schulze

Weizsaecker Document 275

Fxhlbit 262,

Doc„

Bk,

5

In this same category also belongs the affidavit

by Prof. Dr. F. Siegmund-Schulze, a German refugee who
knew weizsaecker during his stay in Berne and who
relates essentially the snme facts as does Pastor
Gerstenmayer.
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Affidavit

by Karl Barth

Weizsaecker Document

353

Exhibit 242

The famous theologian called Weizsaecker "a gentleman
of pure character".

The fact that he sympathized with

the church opposition in Germany at

that time berars no

relation to the criminal activities with which he is

charged.

At that time many high government officials

in Nazi Germany sympathized with the Protesto.nt Church
.N

which was then under attack by the Nazi created rival
"German Church".

In the end the -official church won

out and was not seriously molested any longer^ except when
courageous churchmen, like Pastor Niemoeller^ critized
the Government.

Nazi officials in sympathy with the

Church then included Traffic Minister Eltz von Ruebenach

who resigned In protest against the persecution of the
Churchs in 1937, one year before Weizsaecker became

Ribbentrop's State Secretary.

Affidavit by Ernst Brandenburg
Weizsaecker Document 345

Exhibit 245, Doc, Bk. 5
The essence of this affidavit as far as it relates
to the defendnnt directly at all is that Weizsaecker

during a dinner in 1937 advocated a revisionist policy

in respect to National Socialism,
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(4) Affidavits dealing ^^ith
WeizsaeckerJ^s position
at the Vatican

Affidavit hy Dr. Georg Viktor Bruns
Weizsaecker Document 15

flxhibit 858, Doc,

Bk. 5

Dr. Bruns, a member of Hlbbentrop's !iinisterial
Bureau, asserts that he kept the State Secretary

continuously informed on the goings on in ^^ibbentrbp's' '
vicinity.

To what ends '.Veizsaecker utilized this

information must be regarded as conjecture.
Although von Kessel was to be the liaison man
between Weizsaecker and the conspirators after the

defendant became ambassador at the Vatican (see tr.p,
10977) Bruns also claims to have acted in that capacity.
As evidence for this claim he cites coded letters which

he received from the defendant which ,are given elaborate
interpretations.

Bruns further states that "according to Weizsaecker^s

views, he was considered as belonging to the circle of

w
20 July conspir.ators. "

This statement speaks for itself.

The fact that Weizsaecker was not molested or

dismissed from his post at the Votlcan is inadequately

explained by the fact "that the Allied occupation of
Rome made it impossible to recall Weizsaecker or have

him brought back to Germany as well as to send another
ambassador to the Vatican."

It seems hardly feasible

that Hitler would let himself be represented at the

Holy See by a man whom he suspected of plotting his
assassination,
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Affi^AVit by G-uenther von Bismark
Welzsaecker Document 150

Exhibit 278, Doc, Bk,

5

This affiant was a frequent guest at Weissaecker's
house in Rome in the fall of 1943 and claims to know

that the defendant although always "reserved in his
speech" i^evealed to him that only the elimination of
regime and an end to the war would justify his remaining
in office.

\

Affidavit by Dr.

Wilhelm Melchers

Weizsaecker Document 17

Exhibit 260, Dqc, Bk. 5
Dr. Melchers merely confirms th-^t von Weizsaecker
helped to retain in office a number of younger officials
most of whom have testified on his behalf.
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9.

LEG.a ..3PECTS OF_Tp^JPI^ OFJ'JEI^L^_;4®^ HpS''

KUSH'IBERG PRECEDENTS

The cr.se ?.t br.r is not the first one in y;hich the Nuernberg

Tribune.ls hr.ve been fr.cod v/ith the plee. of "resistr.nce" or "dual
nature".

(1) Jiff JUDGpNT
In the HIT Judg;".ient^ the decisions concerning the defondrnts

Soyss-Inquart (Volur.ie 1^ page 330)^von Neurath (Volujic I, ixge
336)j and Speer (Voluiao
connection.

p<age 333) should be r.icntioned in this .

In the case of Joyss-Inquartj the Tribunal v/as faced

ivith a defendant who_, involved by his official position in atrocities

corr.iitted in an occupied country, nevertheless in certain cases

opposed e^cbrcne .acasures and attenpted to reduce the nuifoer of
victiis.

He was convicted and sentenced to death.

In the case of von Neurath, the Tribunal had to deal ^/ith a

' • /I'
I-

I,

defendant who claii.iod that he resigned fron the Office of iiinistcr

of Foreign .affairs upon boconing aware of Hitler's aggressive v/ar

plans, and that he took charrc again of the foreign affairs of
Nazi-Gornany onl;^ to proiiotc peaceful sottlor.cnt of pending issues;
noroover, thr.t as "Protector" of Bohei"da and lioravia, ho advised

a.vainst the atrocious policy inaugurated frori other sides, and
upon the failure of these his efforts, resigned fron his position.
The Tribuna.l considered those circivistances as nerely nitigatirig,
for it convicted hin and sentenced hir.i to fifteen years of Inprisonriont.

•i
In the case of Spoor, the H'lT was faced with a defendant who,
in the last ptia.so of the war, actively opposed and even counter
acted Hitler's scorched earth policy orders.
.• -v

177,.'

»isfe
mW'-'
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He was convicted and

i.Qntencod. to twenty yenrs of ii:iprisoni.ient.

(i)_ TM JUSTICE a.3S_
In the Justice C-.se (Cnsc No. 3), the Tribunal touched upon

aspects :.iorG or less related to our subject natter in its decision
respectively concGrnin^^- the defendants Schle£;;clberi^'er, Lautz^
Joel and .jLtstoettcr.

Schlopolbercer^ s plea thnt he did not

resign fron office before 1943 -ut of foar tha.t a worse nan would

take his place, did not save hin fron life inprisonrxnt (Case No. 3,
Trial Transcript Pages 10793^ 10794).

(3)„ H03T..GES_C^3E
In the Hostages Case (Case No. 7)^ the defendant General
Lanz "VTas sentenced to iaprisonnont for life in spite of the fact

tha.t he first had refused to carry out an atrocious superior order

and only obeyed it after, pursuant to his request, it had been
so r-nended as to roduco the nunber of persons affected as victins

(Case No. 7} Trial Transcript pp. 10535^10536).

In the saiae case,

Ld.st, v;as sentenced to i'lprisoniaont for life, even though the
Tribunal gave sono credit to his plea of diseidenco \;ith the Nazi
rerino and that he attonptcd to nodorate the atrocious effect of

superior orders vfhich ho felt duty bound to car^'y out, finally,
tl"iat ho 7fas relieved fron the coniand upon his ovm request (Case

No. 7, Trial Transcript pp, 10479~lC4Sl). The Tribunal stated:
"These facts nay not be onployod, hov^ever, to free the defendant

fron, the responsibility for criies coi.mitted,
.

•
-"4

They

are natrrial-only to the extent that they bear upon the question

of nitigation of punishncnt." However, even in the last nontioned
respect, not tco nuch weight wa " given to thcj.i, it appears fron
the sentence.
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I4i ^EaS^.TZGRUCTN
In the Einsr.tzgru^^pGn Cnse_, str.tcnents of tho Tribunal,
iiorc or loss renotoly bearing upon our subject natter, nay be
found in the decisions respectively concerning the defendants

Ohlondorf, Jocst and Nosko,

Ohlendorf was sentenced to death

in spite of his plea that he was in opposition to part of the
Nazi syston oven though ho went along with it in other respects.
The Tribunal gave this answer:

"If the hur.icanitarian and the

Einsatz leader are nerged into one person, it could bo assumed
that

are here dealing with a. cliaractor such as that described

by Robert Louis Stevenson in liis 'Dr. Jokyl and lir. H3''de
Is interesting as it would be to dwell on this possible dual

nature, tho Tribunal cm only nake its radjudication on tho

Ohlendorf who, by his own word, headed an orgmization wiiich,

according to its ov/n reports, killed 90^000 people.,,," (Case
No. 9, Trial Transcript pp. 6785^6786),

This pica of "dual

nature" was quite similar to th?.t of \)EIZS.ECKER who, after being
faced -with his signature under documents connected vdth the

annihilation of r.iillions of Jows, stated:

These v/ore docuj.ients

"which I would not touch in nor:ia.l times v/ith ny own h ndsi"

In the smic cp.so, tho defendmt Joost was given life in-

prisonment though the Tribunal seems to have oirtended sorae drcdit
to his pica of a particular kind of resistance, especially that

he opposed an atrocious superior order, in the execution of which
he v/as involved and that he wac-. therefore recalled and subjected

to disciplinary action (Case No. 9, Trial Transcript p. 679^-) •
Finally, Nosko was sentenced to imprisonnont for life in

spite of his plea, ap^:arently unrofuted, that upon his return
to Gorriany, froji his e:cfcermination mission abroad, ho successfully

protested ag.-.inst planned extermina.tion of Jews in a particular
- 77 -

•. I '

^

•'

SGction of the Zone of Interior (Case No, 9* Trial Transcript

pp. 6S51,6fi52).
i.5j, J'vi^DIC^^C^oE _
The finclinrs in the Ilcuicp.l Case a^^r.inst the defendant
Sicvers is tix) one r.iost applicable to the case at bar against
VjHIZS.DCICER.

Most of the defendants in the previous Nurnberg

oases who pleaded sone fora of resistance^ such as Scyss-Inquart
in the Netherlands^ von Neiirath in Czechoslovakia^ or the Generals^
Lanz and.List^ or the SS officers^ Ohlendorf, Jocst^ Noest_,
offered their resistance on the receiving crd of specific or
diroctival orders^, issued to thoj'i frora the law and dccree-mking
central govomncnt agencies in whoso plaruiing and policy-iuaking
they had no hand.

In contrast j Sievcrs in tho Ilodical Case like the defendant

VlEIZS.,SCKIilR^ and other defondcntB in this procoeding3_, belonged to
the Very

1. group v/ho v/orked in the key agencies in Berlin.

^

VJZIZS.JSCKj®^ likG the other defendants in this case, fomulated

^

and inploncnted the govorniaent policy of war crines and crlaes
against huiaanity which wcro executed by others.
The Siovors decision contains tlie follovojig findings, as to

resistance (Case No. 1 Trial Transcript pp. 11486,11487):"Siovorsi
second aatter of defense is oqually untenable.

In support of the

defense Siov.rs offorod evidoncO by which ho hoped to prove that

as early as 1933 ho bocajao a r.iGr.boz' of a secret resistance novenent which plotted to ovcrtlirovi) the Na.zi Gcvomncnt a.nd to
assassinate Hitler and Hir-i'jler; that as a loading Liea.ber of tho

group, Sicvers obtained the appointraent as Reich Business Liana.ger
of the Ihnencrbe so that ho could be close to Hir-inlGr and observe

his -iove:.ients; that in this position he becojio eniaoshed in the
- 78 -
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revolting; criiics^ the subject no.tter of this xndictLient: thr.t
ho ronodnod as Business lioaiagcr upon advice of his resistance

loader to .pain vital inforr.iation which v/ould hasten the day of
the ovorthroTf of the Nazi C-cvcmiaentj and the liberation of the
helpless peoples cor.iin.'j under its donination.

'Ussxu'aing;__a3,l_bhG5._._thjji.2;s ^o_b_e truOjj_ w_caPG.°t
ii

fact roiiains that

nurders vjere coniiitted with cooperation of the ,duionerbe against
countless thousands of wretched concentration coup ini.iates who

had not tho slightest ncans of resistance, Siovers directed the
orograi".! by ivhich those nurders wore cor-i.d-ttcd,

is.
IP'ii thad_p._^r£si_sjbanc_e_ wor^^^
coixdt^no cr:Laq,_^and.loapt^j>f all,. arain^.>ho_.^^^^

A®-

^U£,iqsGd to he_ j^rote^tjH^.jJ. (Underscorings adoed)
Siovers was found guilty cand scrtonced to death.

I
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